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ABSTRACT 
 
 After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe the notions of a ‘return to 
Europe’ and a ‘common European house’ emerged as powerful concepts, particularly in 
the Western Balkans. But the Western Balkans had to walk through Purgatory on its road 
to Europe. A bloody war dragged on for ten years involving all the peoples of the region. 
But today the peoples and the governments of the Western Balkans are committed to 
leaving behind their past through the European integration process for Southeastern 
Europe. This accession procedure is long and complicated with ample scope for 
difficulties to arise. Considering the region’s unequal capabilities, the financial burden of 
reconstruction and stabilization, as well as the potentially counterproductive effects of the 
European Union initiatives, the problems of the Western Balkans could be better solved 
by including all countries of the region in the same process of European enlargement. 
This policy might be based on the economic strength of the European Union and consider 
the very small economic proportions of the Western Balkans. It should give priority to 
economic rather than to political or civil-society incentives and give preference to 
European solutions over bilateral support for reform efforts or intraregional cooperation.  
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 The Balkan war dragged on for ten years involving Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, 
Slovenes and Albanians. The conflict is currently contained but thousands of people of 
the region lost their lives. Women and children were killed, violated and displaced by 
terror and genocide; and their homes were destroyed. This ten-year war history is a 
bloody record of what people call ‘the cost of non-Europe’. Disintegration in the Western 
Balkans has aggravated poverty and interethnic hatred while the integration process has 
brought to the member states of the European Union significant political stability and an 
impressive increase in economic well being.  
The late nineties saw the European Union significantly change its political 
approach to the Western Balkans. The leaders of the European Union resolved that a 
policy of emergency reconstruction was not sufficient to get the Western Balkans out of 
conflicts, but their integration into European structures would realize that goal. For this 
purpose they offered the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, the Stabilization and 
Association Process, and the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development 
and Stabilization Program.  
The Stabilization and Association Process is a long-term policy aimed at 
establishing the rule of law, democratic and stable institutions, and a free market, but the 
principle of conditionality of the Stabilization and Association Process clashes with the 
principle of regionality of the Stability Pact. The policies of the Stability Pact, being 
long-term structural projects, suffer from the anxiety and the expectations of the region to 
produce sustainable and reliable results in the short term. Thus, conditionality creates 
differences and tensions that regionality cannot overcome.  Furthermore, the regionality 
principle and EU enlargement are dividing the Balkans into two different parts, while the 
EU simultaneously promotes multilateral cooperation among the states of the same 
region. Thus, regional cooperation, as a condition for pre-accession, may damage the 
progress of democratic reforms and of the rule of law, thereby creating new tensions in 
the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, there is no clear connection between the Stability 
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Pact and the Stabilization Process, despite the fact that the instruments of the Stability 
Pact contains the expression, “The Stability Pact is complementary to the Stabilization 
and Association Process and the accession process.” 
 Taking into account the region’s unequal capabilities, the financial burden of 
reconstruction and stabilization, as well as the potentially counterproductive effects of 
EU initiatives for the region, the problems of the Western Balkans can be better solved by 
including all countries of the region in the same process of European enlargement. It 
would dramatically improve the situation and would help fulfill all the conditions of the 
pre-accession process very soon. Otherwise, it will take decades for the Western Balkans 
to meet their requirements posed by the present European initiatives. 
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The whole work is divided into five chapters. Chapter one will introduce the 
historic and political background of the Western Balkans, its people and their animosities, 
its economy, and their present efforts to join the West.  
Chapter two will examine the current European Union policies towards the 
Western Balkans. These include The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and the 
Stabilization and Association Process as the new road to security, stability, increased 
prosperity, and reduced poverty for all peoples living in the Western Balkans. This 
chapter will also present arguments on the negative effects of these initiatives in that they 
damage regional cooperation.  
Chapter three will present a new solution as the most promising and cost-effective 
way to resolve the problems of the countries of the Western Balkans. A solution that 
should defuse tensions, and promote security, stability and prosperity both for the region 
and for Europe as a whole, and call attention to the importance of strong institutions and 
good governance. Chapter four will focus on security issues and chellanges of the 
Western Balkans, which since 1991 has been a Euro-Atlantic responsibility and 
permanent concern. The last chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations for a 
quick integration of the Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic Institutions and the European 
Union, thereby enhancing the security, stability and prosperity of the entire region. 
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II.  THE WESTERN BALKANS: A MULTICULTURAL REGION 
 The Western Balkans1 conflict dragged on for ten years and involved Serbs, 
Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes and Albanians.  
The conflict is currently contained, but thousands of people in the region lost their 
lives. Women and children were killed, violated and displaced by terror and genocide; 
their homes were destroyed. It is not easy amidst this suspicion, hatred, discontent and 
extremism to iron things out, and some questions emerge2. Why did all that happen? 
What went wrong?  
A brief review of the history might help us answer these questions and look 
forward to the future.  
A. HISTORIC AND POLITICAL ORIGINS OF A MULTICULTURAL 
            REGION 
 The Balkan Peninsula has remains of human habitation dating back to 
approximately 6000 B.C.3. The oldest peoples of the region are the Greeks and the 
Albanians. The area contained the center of ancient Greek and Illyrian4 civilization. The 
political history of the Western Balkans has been affected by its geographic proximity to 
other great centers of civilization and by the configuration of the land, which offers easy 
access to foreign invaders and at the same time encourages division and diversity within 
the region. Outside interference and internal political conflict have thus been dominant 
characteristics of its history. Situated at the continental crossroads of the Eastern 
Hemisphere, the area has been subject to successive waves of invasion and to a wide 
variety of cultural influences. Romans, Venetians, Crusaders, Tatars, Kumans, Turks, 
                                                          
1 The Balkans is the easternmost of Europe’s three great southern peninsulas and, collectively, the countries 
located there. The name "Balkan" is derived from the Turkish word for mountain and usually refers to 
countries south of the Sava and lower Danube rivers. In the 19th century, when the term was first used, it 
usually designated the territory under the direct or indirect control of the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty 
of Karlowitz (1699). It did not include the lands held by the Habsburg Empire before 1918 that are now 
integral parts of Balkan states. The Western Balkans is a group of multicultural nations of Southeastern 
Europe, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosova, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. 
2 Abenheim, D., United Germany, Nationalism and Militarism, Postsdam and the Maintenance of 
Tradition, p.18, Naval Postgraduate School, Springfield, VA, 1992. 
3 Early traces of human life in Albania have been found in Cakran settlement, which belongs to middle 
Neolithic times (5000 BC) and whose civilization is very similar to contemporary civilizations north of the 
Adriatic [Jacques, E. E., The Albanians, An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present, p. 4, 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1995 and Pollo, S. and Puto, A., The History of Albania from its 
Origins to the Present Day, p. 1, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.] 
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Magyars, and Germans, to mention only a few, have all left their mark on the land. Some 
of the conquests, for instance that of the Romans, were beneficial to the territory. The 
successive barbarian5 invasions from the north, however, were extremely detrimental, 
and the later years of Ottoman domination brought a long period of stagnation in the 
development of the Balkan peoples. Each conquest, however, has had a determining 
effect on all aspects of Balkan civilization, especially on the ethnic composition of the 
population6. 
 After the division of the Roman Empire in 285 A.D., the greater part of the Balkan 
Peninsula fell to the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire with its capital at Constantino-
ple7. The Byzantine Empire remained the most powerful military, political, and cultural 
force in the area for a thousand years. Its position of religious leadership was most 
important. After 1054, when the Christian churches of East and West split, 
Constantinople became the center of the Orthodox world, and its influence extended over 
the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans. 
 Although the Western Balkan nations share certain traditions and general 
characteristics as a result of their similar histories, relations between the major political 
groups have almost continually been strained and competitive, even in the face of outside 
menace.  
 In the 14th century the Christian Balkan states, whose relations were charac-
terized by intense and bitter rivalry, fell to the Muslim Turks. For roughly 500 years 
Ottoman influence remained predominant in the Balkans because the Christian peoples 
failed to unite against a common foe. 
Although a revived spirit of nationalism spread through the Balkans at the end of 
the 18th century, independence from Turkish rule was achieved only by slow stages 
throughout the 19th century. Thus, national pressures, together with the conflicting 
interests of the great powers, who were intervening in Balkan politics, placed the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 The Albanians are decedents of the Illyrians.  
5 There were numerous barbarian invasions of the Balkan Peninsula, but that of the Slavs, which began in 
the 5th century and reached a peak in the 6th and 7th centuries, had the greatest effect on the subsequent 
ethnic composition of the area.  
6 Jelavich, B., History of the Balkans: 20th Century, v. 2, p. 80, Cambridge University Press, 1993.  
7 Zickel, E. and Iwaskiw W.R., Albania, a Country Study, p. 82, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
1994. 
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peninsula in a state of almost continual turmoil. The Balkan Peninsula was the scene of 
warfare in 1821-1829, 1853-1856, 1875-1878, 1885, 1897, and 1912-19138. The unset-
tling effect of these contests was accentuated by frequent civil wars. Because of the stra-
tegic significance of the peninsula, the "Eastern Question", the problem of determining 
the political fate of the increasingly feeble Ottoman Empire, became the chief issue in 
European international relations from 1815 to 1914. The main antagonists in the 
diplomatic conflict were Britain and Russia. Concerned with the preservation of its 
communications with the East and with India in particular, Britain feared that the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire would be followed by Russian domination of the area9. Britain, 
therefore, tried to maintain Ottoman power while simultaneously securing reforms in the 
administration of the subject nationalities. Russia, on the other hand, was more willing to 
give direct help to the Slavic people of the Balkans10. Austria, apprehensive of a growth 
of Russian power, tended to take the British position11. France, at odds with Britain over 
other Mediterranean issues, took a pragmatic approach, changing its position in every 
crisis to meet the demands of its own interests12.  
 Despite the contradictory aims and policies of the great powers, the Albanians, 
Montenegrins, and Serbians were able to establish their independence after the Balkan 
Wars13. Although the pattern of borders drawn in 191314 laid the basis for the modern 
                                                          
8 Jelavich, B, pp 46-50, pp 95-100.  
9 Zickel, p. 17 
10 Jelavich, Ch., Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of 
Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886, p. 28, University of California Press, 1958. 
11 One of the events of Balkan history that had so critical an effect on subsequent Balkan problems that it 
needs be spotlighted first is the Congress of Berlin in 1878, where the great powers of Europe drastically 
revised the Treaty of San Stefano that had partitioned Ottoman lands earlier in the same year. The Treaty of 
San Stefano had been signed in March 1878 between a defeated Turkey and a victorious Russia. Under the 
treaty, the sultan recognized the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; but Albania, although 
given autonomy, was to remain a nominal part of Ottoman Empire. 
12Waltz, K. N., Theory of international Politics, Structural Causes and Military Effects, pp 160-193,  
Assidon-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979. 
13 Pollo, p. 146 and Jelavich, B, pp 100-103.  
14 In 1913 the Conference of Ambassadors in London left out half of the Albanians and the Albanian lands 
and gave Serbia, Montenegro and Greece sovereignty over Kosova, Plava, Gutsia and Thiameria 
(Çamëria). From that date on, Serb nationalists have constantly massacred the Albanian Population of 
Kosova. Between 1913 and 1941 about 300,000 Albanians were forced to leave [Malcolm, N., Kosovo: A 
Short History, p. 286, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998].  
Tito period (1945-1980): renewed Serbian suppression and persecution. Due to the Prague Spring of 1968, 
Tito upgraded the status of Kosova in 1974, but he didn’t make of it a republic. The people were 
disappointed and demonstrated [Lee, M., “Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania,” New Left Review, 
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map of the Balkans, instability continued in the region, largely due to conflicting Austro-
Hungarian and Serbian ambitions over the control of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
assassination of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand in Bosnia by a young Serbian 
revolutionary on June 28, 1914, resulted in an Austrian declaration of war on Serbia that, 
because of a network of interlocking military alliances throughout Europe, precipitated 
World War I15. 
 The Great War brought about major changes in the political map of the Western 
Balkans. In 1918, Yugoslavia was formed from Serbia, Montenegro, and the Habsburg 
south Slav lands. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became "Yugoslavia" 
after a royal coup d’état in 192916. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
140 July-August, pp 62-91, 1983]. However, after Tito the economic situation deteriorated and 
unemployment was very high (three times the national average). Calls were made for Kosova to be granted 
republic status in order to help it overcome these difficulties, but this did not happen [Lampe, J.R, 
Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, 2nd edition, p. 337, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000 and Lee, p. 67].  
Milosevic’s rise to power marked a return to a tougher policy [Ramet, S, Whose Democracy? Nationalism, 
Religion and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe, p.148, Lanham and Oxford,  
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997] and the autonomy of the province was revoked in 1989. Milosevic and the 
Serbs exerted significant pressure to ensure that Albanian leaders resign; that the Academy of Sciences in 
Kosova be abolished; that Albanian street names be changed to Serbian; and that Serbs receive preferential 
treatment. The Albanians were fired from their posts (130,000 between 1990 and 1995) and lost their 
homes to Serbs, 20,000 people were violated, illegally detained, or raped, and 200 were killed [Ramet, S., 
p. 148; Ramet, S., Balkan Babel, 3rd ed, p. 308, New York, Westview Press, 1999; Leurdijk, D and Zandee, 
D., Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, pp 17-23, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001]. Between November 1994 
and January 1995 alone, 25,000 were forced to leave [Rama, S.A., “The Serb-Albanian War and the 
International Community’s Miscalculations,” International Journal of Albanian Studies, cited at 
www.albanian.com/IJAS/vol2/is1.html, 2000 and Ramet 1999 p. 308]. Their homes and businesses were 
looted and burned. 
In the summer of 1998, a quarter of a million Kosovars were forced from their homes as their houses, 
villages and crops were destroyed. As more Kosovars fled, the Serbs implemented a resettlement policy 
and Albanian property was simply confiscated [Ramet 1997, pp 151-152].  
By late September 1998 Western anxieties about Serb actions in Kosova had reached their peak. As 
diplomatic negotiations collapsed, ethnic violence threatened to spill over. The West no longer accepted 
Serb claims of an internal matter and felt that it had no choice but to start Operation Allied Force on 24 
March 1999 (concluded on 10 June 1999). 
15 Thompson, K. W., Morgenthau, S. and Morgenthau, M., Politics among Nations, The struggle for Power 
and Peace, p.3-17, McGrow-Hill, Inc 1993, and Jelavich, B, p. 112.  
16 The idea of Yugoslavia was first suggested in Croatia in the 1830s by a movement who wanted all south 
Slavs to unify culturally and politically to defend themselves against aggressive Ottoman, German, Italian, 
and Hungarian nationalisms. It was then assumed that the culturally advanced Croatian city Zagreb would 
be the centre of this proposed state. The idea remained only a dream for almost a century, for there was no 
opportunity to form a new Yugoslav state until the end of World War I, when the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian Empires were both defeated and dismembered by the allied victors. In 1912 Serbia "joined” a 
coalition with Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro to attack Ottoman Turkey. Thus, the First Balkan War 
ended by Turkey’s ceding almost all its European possessions. The next year, in the Second Balkan War 
Serbia doubled its size and territory, incorporating more non-Serbs than it could either assimilate or 
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 In general, the years between World War I and World War II were difficult for all 
the Western Balkan states. Until 1924, when the future king of Albania took over, 
Albanian governments appeared and disappeared in rapid succession and prepared the 
road to Italian penetration17, Yugoslavia suffered from the inability of the Serbs and 
Croats to adjust their traditional rivalries within the new state. All the nations had internal 
economic difficulties and severe minority problems. The rise of fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany in the 1930s brought the states face to face with an immediate threat in the 
international field. In 1939 Albania was annexed by Italy. In 1940 Italy’s dictator, Benito 
Mussolini, launched an invasion of Greece. The Italians inability to carry through this 
campaign led to a German invasion of both Greece and Yugoslavia in 1941. The 
conditions of this conflict and the occupation that followed led to the creation of large 
guerrilla forces in all countries of the Western Balkans. These forces were of great 
political significance18 later. The frequency and intensity of these conflicts have left a 
deep imprint on the outlook of the peoples, and they help to account for the low 
economic level of the area throughout most of its history. The end of the war in 1945 
introduced a period of revolutionary change. Communist regimes came to power, as they 
did throughout Eastern Europe, until 1989. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
eliminate. The Muslim populations particularly suffered from the brutality of these wars [Bennet, Ch., 
Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences, pp. 22-23, New York University Press, 
1995]. 
It was the Western allies who created Yugoslavia from the fragments of the two empires they had 
vanquished. At its founding in 1918 Yugoslavia was known as the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes’. The Serbian Prince Alexander, who had sided with the war’s victors, agreed to unite his territory 
with the former Habsburg lands with Belgrade as its capital [Bennett, p. 29].  It had a territory of about 
248,000 square km and a population of about 12 million [Crnobrnja, M., The Yugoslavia’s Drama (2nd ed.), 
p. 51, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996].  
The Croats were immediately disappointed, for the new state gained control of their funds and replaced 
their old Habsburg institutions with Serbian ones [Bennett, p. 35]. No efforts to integrate the old states 
through compromise were successful. No parliamentary coalitions could be created that transcended the 
concerns of nationality groups. The former Habsburg subjects resisted the dominant Serbs, sometimes 
violently, [Necak, D., Historical Elements for Understanding the Yugoslav Question, p. 23, Payam 
Akhavan and Robert Howse, eds., The Brookings Institute, 1995].  In 1928 King Alexander became 
dictator of the country, giving it the new name ‘Yugoslavia’. 
Some Croatians wanted full independence and were prepared to use violent means of breaking up the 
country. In particular, the fascist Ustasha-Croat Revolutionary Organization, led by Ante Pavelic, which 
received support from Mussolini (Spencer, p.5). 
17 Zickel, pp 28-32.  
18 Pollo, p. 227.  
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 The frequent invasions of the Balkan Peninsula are largely responsible for the 
political divisions of the area and the variety of national characteristics among the people.  
 The tendency of the Balkan nations to follow separate paths of national 
development continued into the years after World War II. Subsequently, however, 
alterations were made in the relationships that had been established in the immediate 
postwar years. In 1948, in a sharp controversy with Soviet premier Joseph Stalin, 
Yugoslav premier Tito claimed his country’s right to develop its own brand of socialism. 
 When the Cominform19 expelled Yugoslavia on June 28, 1948, Albania made a 
rapid change in its policy toward Yugoslavia. Three days later, Tirana gave Yugoslav 
advisers in Albania forty-eight hours to leave the country, canceled all bilateral economic 
agreements, and entered an orbit around the Soviet Union. 
 In 1960, Albania broke with the Soviet Union, and thereafter sought closer 
relations with the People’s Republic of China20.  
 For 40 years after World War II, Balkan politics were dictated by the Cold War 
between the superpowers. It was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union after 1989 
that the Balkan states rediscovered possibilities for real political change. However, 
throughout the Western Balkans the construction of democratic politics was seriously 
hampered by the lack of a tradition of political participation, by vestiges of dictatorial 
order, by severe economic problems, by ethnic divisions21, and by a bloody and bitter 
ten-year war. 
B. THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN BALKANS  
 Today most of the states are relatively homogeneous in ethnic composition. The 
main important exceptions to ethnic homogeneity are the large Albanian populations in 
Macedonia22 and Montenegro, the Hungarians in the Serb Vojvodina, and the Serbs in 
Kosova. 
                                                          
19 Communist Information Bureau 
20 Zickel, pp 42-43.  
21 Ethnicity came to be especially important in the Balkans during the 19th century, when the division of 
the Habsburg and Ottoman empires began to result in modern states without respect for patterns of 
language or religious adherence. 
22 The official name of Macedonia is the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Some 
countries, such as Albania, have recognized FYROM as Macedonia, but Greece is still strongly opposing 
this recognition.  
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 The states of the region are organized on a national basis, with a centralized state 
administration (except for Kosova, it is under a United Nations administration) and with a 
single language and religion predominating (the Albanians in Macedonia are trying to use 
their language as an official one, but their efforts have not succeeded yet).  
 Albania has a population of over 3 millions. The Albanians, as the Greeks, speak 
ancient and very distinctive non-Slavonic languages23. The Albanian language, written in 
Latin, though Indo-European, is entirely distinct from the tongues spoken elsewhere in 
the region, and is the only surviving representative of the Thraco-Illyrian group of 
languages, which was spoken by the inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula before the 
Roman period24.   
 The population of the states emerging from the former Yugoslavia is almost 23 
million. They are all Slavs, except for the Kosovars, and form the majority of the 
population in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The 
Macedonians speak their own Slavic language. The Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and 
Montenegrins all speak dialects of Serbo-Croatian. The Kosovars are Albanians and they 
speak Albanian. Dating from the 9th century, when local tribes began to be converted to 
Christianity through the influence of adherents of either the Roman Catholic or Orthodox 
churches, the South Slav languages have been written in either the Latin script (parts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia) or the Cyrillic script (Serbia, parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia)25.  
 The rich and varied cultural heritage of the Balkan Peninsula is reflected in the 
life of its people and in the monuments of its past. In addition to the major trends, each 
Balkan people, indeed each individual area, has developed its own unique peasant 
culture, which is reflected in folk songs, costumes, village architecture, and painting. 
 Religion also imparts a significant measure of diversity. The Serbs, the 
Macedonians, the Montenegrins and part of the Albanians are Christian Orthodox. The 
Croats are predominantly Roman Catholic, as part of the Albanians are. Islam is adhered 
to by the Turkish minority and the majority of the Albanians. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
                                                          
23 Chekrezi, C. A, Albania: Past and Present , p.18, New York,  Macmillan, 1919. 
24 Cabej, E., "Per gjenezen e literatures shqipe (On the Genesis of Albanian Literature),” Hylli i Drites, p. 
8-15, 84-93, 149-80, Shkoder, 1939.  
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but also in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, many indigenous Slavs converted to 
Islam following the arrival of the Ottoman Turks in the 14th century, and these people, 
while undistinguished from their neighbors in other ways, regard themselves as ethnic 
Muslims.  
 Churches of the Eastern Orthodox tradition predominate. They are organized on a 
national basis and are autocephalous as the Albanian Orthodox Church, Macedonian 
Orthodox Church and Serbian Orthodox Church26. 
C. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 Although many parts of the Balkan Peninsula are relatively rich in natural 
resources, the region has lagged behind the rest of Europe with respect to economic 
development.  
 In modern times the economic life of the Balkan nations has been backward in 
comparison with that of the rest of Europe27. The great differences in the standards of 
living and in the natural endowments of the different regions have been important aspects 
of Balkan economic life.  
 The communist governments, which took over throughout the region after the 
World War II, embarked on a radically new course of economic development, including 
the abolition of private enterprise and concentration on rapid industrialization under 
strong state control and direction28. Despite the fact that no Balkan state had a really 
adequate base for the system, the socialist governments developed their economies 
according to the Soviet model29. Each nation attempted to construct a balanced industrial 
complex. They first emphasized the development of heavy industry, with the result that 
production of consumer goods suffered by contrast. Throughout most of the region, the 
dogmatic communist identification of economic progress with the development of mining 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 Arnakis, G. G., The Balkans in Transition, p. 119, University of California Press, 1963. 
26 Arnakis, pp 133-140.  
27 Historically, the mixed terrain of mountains, hills, valleys, and plains meant a scarcity of good farmland 
and an absence of roads, which, in turn, hindered commerce and the growth of towns. For many centuries, 
the basic settlement was the small, self-sufficient farming village, and large towns and cities were few or 
nonexistent. 
28 Spulber, N., The Balkans in Transition, p. 369, University of California Press, 1963.  
29 Jelavich, Ch. and B., p. xv 
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and manufacturing resulted in a neglect of agriculture30, excessively high rates of ur-
banization, and an aging rural population. 
 The economic policies and external trade relations have been closely associated 
with their political evolution and with world events. Although in the immediate postwar 
period the Soviet Union gained a predominant influence in the socialist countries of 
Albania and Yugoslavia, this relationship soon underwent significant modifications. 
Yugoslavia in 1948 and Albania in 1960 asserted their right to independent development 
in relation to the other socialist countries of the Eastern Block. These actions were 
accompanied by changes within the states as well as shifts in their external trade 
relations. After breaking with the Soviet Union, Albania tried to increase its trade both 
with the West and with China, while Yugoslavia accepted extensive aid from the United 
States and developed its trade with the West31. 
 Albania broke with China in 1978 and the Stalinist regime led the country into 
deep isolation until 1991. Yugoslavia’s system of "workers’ self-management" proved 
both more flexible and more responsive to the need for consumer goods.  
 After the collapse of communist regimes throughout the region in 1989, economic 
reconstruction was endangered. We can find a lot of reasons for that, such as 
technological backwardness, lack of modern managerial skills, shortage of investment, 
the loss of traditional markets, the real practical and legal difficulties involved in 
programs of privatization, and so on, but the essential reason was the ten-year war or the 
Third Balkan War.   
D. THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 
 Scholars throughout Europe and the United States have offered different 
arguments; however, it maybe useful to name the three most common that underpin most 
discussions. There may be some validity in all three reasons or arguments, though 
perhaps more in one than another32. 
                                                          
30 Albania made great efforts to develop its agriculture because it was seen as part of Albania's strategy of 
being independent.  
31 Zickel, p. 82 
32 Spencer, M., The Lessons of Yugoslavia, What Happened in Yugoslavia? p. 39, New York, JAI Imprint, 
2000.  
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 First, one explanation for the tragic and violent breakup can be called the theory 
of a ‘democratic deficit.’ This argument focuses attention on Yugoslavia’s political 
history before the end of the Cold War. It portrays Yugoslavs as inexperienced with 
democratic institutions, unfamiliar with the democratic habits of civil society, and as 
having inherited an unworkable constitution that could not yield solutions to the 
challenges of the 1990s. Had democracy been institutionalized earlier, this theory 
suggests that the collapse might have been avoided. The model criticizes Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milosevic as particularly anti-democratic and suggests that a different leader 
with a proper grasp of pluralism might have facilitated a smooth transition to democracy. 
 Second, there is the ‘nationalist theory,’ an explanation for Yugoslavia’s troubles 
that refers to the long history of ethnic hatred in the Balkans. According to this argument, 
democracy could not have prevented the crisis. Instead, the coming of greater freedom of 
expression actually allowed the citizens to demonstrate overtly their centuries-old hatred 
of other nationalities, in contrast to the communist period when animosities had been 
repressed. This model, which takes nationalistic hatred as immutable, tends to assume 
that the solution to the crisis must involve a partition of the state into separate populations 
who will never learn to live together peaceably because of their long history of 
violence33. 
 It is a mistake to recall warmly the good old days of Josef Broz Tito, because he 
was one of the main source’s of the crisis that has been going on during the 1990s. It was 
he who began to preempt the claims of authentic nationalists, the ‘bourgeois’ 
nationalists34. But the most successful was the Serbian politician Slobodan Milosevic, 
who rode the wave of nationalism in the most outstanding way in the late 80s. He was 
obsessed only with power, and he understood at one point that nationalism was the only 
card left for him to play35. 
                                                          
33 In this context an important role is played by mass media. Not only should they provide the necessary 
information on ethnic diversity, knowledge about ‘others,’ opportunities for meetings and cooperation, and 
education for the management of ethnic conflicts, but they should especially work on the promotion of the 
ideology of cooperation. This should complement or even replace the prevailing ideology of competition 
(Zagar, p. 88). 
34 Licht, S., The Lessons of Yugoslavia, Civil Society, Democracy, and the Yugoslav Wars, p.114, New 
York, JAI Imprint, 2000.  
35 Licht, p. 114-115.  
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 Finally, the economic reason is the third explanation for the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. It points to economic factors, especially the foreign debt that had 
accumulated during the Cold War and the stringent measures imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund to curtail inflation. Yugoslavia was never a rich country, 
and it is true that it underwent a painful belt-tightening shortly before the country broke 
apart. Some observers blame the crisis on the poverty that accompanied the Western 
imposed economic austerity program of the late 1980’s. On the other hand, many other 
analysts, particularly those of Yugoslav background, believe that the harsh economic 
measures were necessary, successful, and even accepted by the citizens.  
E. THE NEW ADVENTURE 
 This ten-year war history has been a bloody record of what people call ‘the cost of 
non-Europe’, but the seeds of conflict come from the diverse pattern of historical 
development of the Balkan states, which were formed in their present structure only in 
1919 after centuries of control as parts of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian 
empires. During that long struggle for independence and recognition, strong animosities 
were engendered over territories occupied and then lost to each other as the fortunes of 
war and empire changed. Thus was born the thorny web of "problem areas" that 
enmeshes the Balkans and prejudices Balkan actions in peace and in war. In addition, the 
conflict in the influences and aspirations of foreign powers, has led to actions inside and 
outside the Balkans, which strongly and directly affected Balkan affairs. 
 The problem areas of today are a result of the interaction of these basic factors. 
They remain constant sources of disunity among Balkan nations and no permanent 
solutions have yet been found. During periods of amity between countries, territorial 
problems lie dormant and are temporarily amicably resolved or tolerated. But in times of 
crisis, both local and international, territorial aspirations are revived and another phase is 
added to the struggle over territories. It is precisely this feature of changeability of 
attitude that makes it so necessary to understand individual areas in their relation to 
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Balkan national issues, especially in the present international situation after ten-year 
war36.   
 In his introduction to a study Hugh Seton-Watson remarks: "Of all my travels I 
think the most enlightening were in the Balkans, whose combination of intellectual 
subtlety and crudity, of tortuous intrigue and honest courage revealed more truths about 
the political animal man than are to be found in most textbooks of political science."37 
 There are perhaps two principal reasons why the life of the Balkans seems to 
provide such insights into the nature of politics and politicians. The first is the peculiar 
combination they present of the familiar and the unfamiliar, the recognizably European 
and the specifically Balkan.  
 It is true, of course, that the foreign policies of the Balkan states have been 
strongly influenced, and complicated, by intra-Balkan relations – it was never just a 
question of relations between great and small powers. Indeed, it may be that the perennial 
precariousness of international relations in the Balkans is a consequence of an 
overlapping of two power systems: the competition of the great powers for influence in 
this strategic area and the mutual rivalry of the emergent Ba1kan sovereignties, which 
could still lead to common action between two or more Balkan states38. 
 The disintegration in Western Balkans has aggravated poverty and inter-ethnic 
hatred while the integration process has brought the member states of the European 
Union (EU) significant political stability and an impressive increase in economic well-
being. The EU integration experience provides an argument in favor of regional 
cooperation as the main road to security, stability, increased prosperity, and reduction in 
poverty for all peoples living in the Western Balkans. 
However, the present Balkan governments should know that throughout history 
the peoples lived side by side and in the most tragic conditions, and they should make 
                                                          
36 Kostanick, H. L., The Geopolitics of the Balkans, Roberts, H. L.: Politics in a Small State: the Balkan 
Example, The Balkans in Transition, Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 10, University of California Press, 1963.  
37 Seton-Watson, H., Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Postwar World, p. 15, New 
York, Praeger, 1960. 
38 Roberts, H. L., The Geopolitics of the Balkans, Roberts, H. L.: Politics in a Small State: the Balkan 
Example, The Balkans in Transition, Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 386, University of California Press, 1963.  
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their efforts to restore the equilibrium in the region the first step towards ending the 
Balkan drama wherein one people oppresses another people. In this long history the 
Balkan peoples have learned that no one people can be crushed by another. They have to 
convince themselves of that truth and renounce the conflict, walking together on the path 
of hope. Within this framework, resolution of the status between the Kosovar Albanians 
and the Serbs is fundamental. If the EU fails to comprehend the respective importance of 
the two peoples there can be no peace in the Balkans. 
Today the Western Balkans needs Europe. But does Europe need the Western 
Balkans? This question may provoke an ironic smile and the thought, “Who on earth 
would be interested in inviting the devil in?”39. 
Europe has the possibility, through the integration process, to make the Western 
Balkans prosperous and bring to Europe not only its marvelous natural resources, but also 
its human and cultural energy. The Continent will also rid itself of the remaining 
prejudices that still veil its vision of the area, the most recent one being the lack of the 
rule of law.  
In the late 1990’s the EU changed significantly its political approach to the 
Western Balkans. The leaders of the EU resolved that a policy of emergency 
reconstruction was not sufficient to get the Western Balkans out of conflicts, but that 
integration into European structures would achieve that objective. For this purpose, on 10 
June 1999, in Cologne, the EU backed by the US and other members of the International 
Community involved in European Affairs offered the Balkan Governments an 
opportunity to leave behind the past and join their efforts by committing themselves to a 
new future under the Stability Pact40 for Southeastern Europe, the Stabilization and 
Association Process and the CARDS program (Community Assistance for 
                                                          
39 Kadare, I., “The Balkans, Truth and Untruth, The southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region,” 
Chaillot Paper 46, p.13, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2001.  
40 The Stability Pact Partners: The SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of 
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia & Montenegro; the European Union Member States and the 
European Commission, non EU-members of the G8: USA, Canada, Japan and Russia; other countries: 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, International 
organizations: UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, International financial institutions: 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB); Regional 
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Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization)41. This objective was confirmed in 
Lisbon, March 2000. The same year, the European Councils at Feira and Nice 
acknowledged the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosova42, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Macedonia43)44 as “potential candidates” and declared a clear prospect of membership on 
the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam, once the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 have been 
met.  
 This policy is looking forward to help the Western Balkan countries transform 
their aspirations into reality. Will solidarity go further? Will the present commitment 
bring the Western Balkan nations to cooperate with one another on behalf of common 
interests? While geography and ethnic diversity have shaped their history, which has 
been one largely of conflict and disunity, there also exists a tradition of regional unity 
grounded in common periods of subjection, in religious ties, in the infrequent but still 
significant cooperation among the respective movements for national liberation in the 
nineteenth century, and in the basic similarities of peasant societies under the impact of 
the winds of change45.  
In this perspective the Western Balkans or the Balkans nations have no other 
choice but to cooperate and look forward to the European Integration. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
initiatives: Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Southeast Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP).  
41 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. 
42 Kosova is under the jurisdiction of the UN and its final status has still not been resolved. 
43 On 14 March 2002 Serbia and Montenegro decided to create a loose federation named Serbia and 
Montenegro.  
44 The European Council, meeting in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 2000, and The European Council, 
meeting in Feira on 19 and 20 June 2000, in Nice on 7-9 December 2000. 
45 Campbell, J. C., The Geopolitics of the Balkans, Roberts, H. L.: Politics in a Small State: the Balkan 
Example, The Balkans in Transition, Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 417, University of California Press, 1963.  
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY TOWARD THE WESTERN 
                      BALKANS 
 
 The unification of Europe will not be complete until 
it includes its Southeastern part.  
European Council46 
 
A. CURRENT PRACTICE  
 The peoples and the governments of the Western Balkans are committed to leave 
behind the past and join the European Union through the Stability Pact for Southeastern 
Europe, the Stabilization and Association Process and CARDS program (Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization).  
 The Stabilization and Association process is a long-term policy aiming at 
establishing the rule of law, democratic and stable institutions, and a free market 
economy in all the states of the Western Balkans, paving their road to the EU. This 
European initiative includes two phases: 
 The first phase is a preparatory one whose main goal is the realization of a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreements is the essential element of the Stabilization and Association Process and the 
most important stage of this journey. The realization of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements represents the commitment of a country to conclude a formal association 
with the EU over a period of time called the transition period. During that period of time 
the determined country should have implemented a free trade area and reforms meeting 
EU standards. This process brings the country closer to the EU. On the other hand, the 
EU observes very carefully the transition period before granting that contract, which, for 
sure, is a political decision. Three years ago a contract was granted to Macedonia only for 
political purposes. At that time Macedonia had not realized any of the conditions foreseen 
in the transition period. 
 The second phase includes the negotiation and the implementation of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreements. These agreements open the green light to the 
EU to work with each individual country of the Western Balkans to bring them closer to 
                                                          
46 The Copenhagen Council, December 2002 
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EU standards. To some extent it is a process we have seen in the Central and Eastern 
European Countries47.  
 The core elements of the agreements are the democratic principles and the free 
market economy in a free trade area with the EU and the associated regulation and 
benefits. The European Commission believes that this process will enable the economies 
of the Western Balkans to begin their integration with the economies of the EU.  
 The Stabilization and Association Agreements takes into consideration the 
situation of each country. Nevertheless, these agreements share a common goal: 
associating the countries of the Western Balkans with the EU, so the bottom line of the 
agreements is the EU. But when? How long does it take for the Western Balkans to 
implement the European obligations? The answer to that question is very simple: it is 
Europe's decision. 
 The EU has set up several mechanisms to assist the Western Balkans according to 
the EU democratic and economic model, such as the Stabilization and Association 
Council, which operates through specialist subcommittees to political level meetings, the 
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization program 
(CARDS). CARDS, which budgets € 4.65 billion for 2002-2006, is foreseen to assist in 
the implementation of the Stabilization and Association process in the countries of the 
Western Balkans in the preparatory process and in the implementation of the Stabilization 
and Association Agreements. CARDS will focus on democratic and economic reforms 
and institution building as the main elements to implement the agreements. 
 However, the Stabilization and Association Agreements encourage the Western 
Balkan countries and their governments to deepen the reforms, to establish the rule of law 
to cooperate to fight organized crime, to open their borders, and to develop bilateral and 
regional trade relations through the free trade agreements.  
 The Stabilization and Association Process is based on conditionality, but it 
includes regional cooperation as well, and if this process will be successful, it will 
certainly defuse tensions throughout the area.  
                                                          
47 Zagreb Summit, 24 November 2000. 
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 The Balkan countries welcomed the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe48 as a 
European initiative to increase economic, political and social cooperation between the EU 
and the countries of the Balkans through three Working Tables49. 
 The Stability Pact package consists of 244 projects from all three Working 
Tables. The most important ones are the projects in the infrastructure sectors: 
transportation, energy and water. In order to realize this project the Pact organized two 
donor conferences, the first in Brussels, March 29-30, 2000, and the second one in 
Bucharest, 25-26 October 2001. In those conferences the SP secured funding for projects 
worth € 5.4 billion.  According to the headquarters of the SP, 97% of the projects had 
started by early 200250.  
 However, the policies of the Stability Pact vis-à-vis long-term structural projects 
suffer from the anxiety and the expectations of the region to produce sustainable and 
reliable results in the short term. 
Regional cooperation is an absolute condition and priority for the Stability Pact, 
as well. Regional problems require regional solutions. . Yet some of the obstacles the 
Stability Pact has to overcome in the implementation phase are directly related to the 
regionality principle. The Western Balkan countries are very different not only from an 
economic viewpoint, but they also face transitional differences, including the bilateral 
relations with the EU, which obstruct regional cooperation51. So, conditionality creates 
                                                          
48 The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999. In the founding 
document, more than 40 partner countries and organizations undertook to strengthen the countries of 
Southeastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic 
prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region". Euro-Atlantic integration was promised to all 
the countries in the region. At a summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999, the Pact was reaffirmed.  
The Stability Pact Partners are the SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro; the European Union Member States and the 
European Commission, non EU-members of the G8: USA, Canada, Japan and Russia; other countries such 
as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Turkey; 
International organizations such as UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD; International 
financial institutions such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB); Regional initiatives such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central 
European Initiative (CEI), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Southeast Europe 
Cooperation Process (SEECP).  
49 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, Working Table I, II, and III, Brussels, 1999.  
50 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, What is the Pact? Brussels, 1999.  
51 European Commission, “CARDS Assistance Program to the Western Balkans, Regional Strategy Paper 
2002-2006,” p. 4- 41, Brussels, 2002.  
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differences and tensions that regionality cannot overcome (the present status of Kosova is 
another obstacle to regional cooperation)52.   
 Furthermore, the regionality principle and EU enlargement are dividing the 
Balkans into two different parts.  Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria are candidate countries 
seeking EU membership in the next round of enlargement. Slovenia will join EU on 1 
May 2004, while the forecast for Romania and Bulgaria is the next round, maybe 200653. 
The three of them, in a manner of speaking, will leave the region and become part of the 
Union. The EU will thus separate the region into two different parts, while at the same 
time the EU promotes multilateral cooperation among the states of the same region. Thus, 
the regional cooperation, as a condition for pre-accession, may damage the progress of 
the democratic reforms and the rule of law, creating new tensions in the Western Balkans.  
 The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe faces tension even between Balkan 
difficulties and European preferences. As a matter of fact, 12% of the project funding 
goes to the First Working Table, Democratization and Human Rights, focusing on four 
priority areas: cross-border cooperation and local democracy building on achievements 
by the Human Rights and Minorities Task Force and the Szeged Process54. 84% goes to 
Working Table II, Economic Reconstruction, a World Bank strategy which aims at 
private sector development, especially through the liberalization of trade, the 
improvement of the business and financial sector; poverty reduction and social 
development, increasing investment in regional infrastructure and enhancing 
environmental protection. Only 4% goes to Working Table III, Security Issues, both 
internal and external, such as mine action, including stockpile destruction55, prevention 
the flow of small arms and light weapons, arms control issues and confidence building 
measures, anticorruption and anti-organized crime initiatives, police training and regional 
police cooperation. In this regard, the Western democracies may take steps to restore the 
                                                          
52 Albania: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) Progress Report, World Bank, February 2001 
and Kosova: Economic and Social Reforms for Peace and Reconciliation, World Bank, February 2001. 
53 Informal European Council Meeting, Signature of the Treaty of Accession, Athens, 16 April 2003 and 
Prodi, R., 2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000.  
54 The Szeged Process is a mechanism that had originally been established to support democratic forces in 
the FRY at the time of the Milosevic regime, more than 40 partnerships have been concluded with cities 
and local authorities governed by opposition parties in Serbia. In March 2002, the Szeged Process 
incorporated the promotion and development of regional, local and cross-border cooperation.  
55 San Francisco Mine Awareness Project to Benefit Landmine Clearance in Balkans, 12 June 2000.  
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lost confidence of the Stability Pact Office by reconsidering the priorities of the region 
during the first phase of the project and offering the suitable ones to the international 
donor community56. 
  On the other hand, the Pact is not entirely an EU responsibility. The European 
Union manages only the Regional Table57. In this context, the realization of the Stability 
Pact will require the European Union to take full responsibility for its implementation. As 
the leading role of the World Bank for Working Table Two is an appropriate choice58, 
NATO is not the leading organization for the Working Table Three59, in spite of the large 
presence of the North Atlantic Alliance throughout the western part of the Peninsula. It 
was a decision taken by the EU and the U.S. in order to obtain the cooperation of the 
Russian government, which was very important for a long-term solution in the Balkan 
Peninsula60.  
 As the two initiatives, the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and the Association 
Process, have the same object, i.e. the development of the Western Balkans and bringing 
the states of the region closer to Europe, this raises an important problem - the 
harmonization of these two policies. If we go through the founding instruments of the 
Stability Pact, we will find the promise of EU integration. It is renewed in the 1999 
Progress Report of the EU, in 2000 and even in 2002. This stand links permanently the 
process of regional security and stability in the Western Balkans to the process of EU 
enlargement. However, the EU took the necessary precautions to connect the European 
                                                          
56 Stability Pact: 1999, 2000, 2001 
57 The Regional Table is the "general assembly" of all the Stability Pact partner countries and institutions. It 
is also the highest decision taking body of the Pact. 
58 World Bank Trade and Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe Project, World Bank, 29 March 2000.  
59 Stability Pact, 1999. 
60 NATO’s air campaign during the Kosovo conflict aroused intense opposition across the entire political 
spectrum in Russia. It also posed a serious dilemma for Moscow: how to oppose NATO’s military action 
without provoking a confrontation with the U.S. and NATO Europe. Russia wanted to bring about a halt to 
NATO military action and have the alliance accept the principle that out-of-area military operations require 
U.N. approval. Moscow tried to use the Kosovo conflict to divide and weaken NATO and to strengthen its 
own ties with China on an anti-U.S. basis. Russia also tried to use the conflict to demonstrate that it too is 
an “indispensable” world power. Seizing the airport of Pristina may have been aimed at exerting pressure 
on NATO to agree to Russian terms for participation in KFOR. At the end Russia softened his behavior and 
cooperated with the U.S. and NATO (Gallis, P. E, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from, Operation Allied Force, 
CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, p. 14, 19 November 1999). 
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perspective for the Western Balkans with the Copenhagen Criteria. Thus, conditionality 
became the main principle for the “pre-pre-accession” of the Western Balkans61.  
 When the Stability Pact was launched, the European Commission remodeled the 
policy of the regional cooperation to the Stabilization and Association Process, but there 
is not any clear connection between the Stability Pact and the Stabilization process, 
despite the fact that the instruments of the Stability Pacts contains the expression “The 
Stability Pact is complementary to the SAP (Stabilization and Association Process) and 
the accession process.”. (The integrating policy through the Stabilization and Association 
process is based on conditions, and the multilateral cooperation among the Balkan 
countries is one of the main conditions of this process.) Nevertheless, the negotiations for 
the Stabilization and Association Agreements will be opened bilaterally. The European 
Parliament will recommend to the European Commission the state which fulfills the basic 
criteria of political stability, good neighborly relations and economic reform (The three 
first Western Balkan countries to open the negotiations for the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements are Albania, Croatia62 and Macedonia. The EU signed the first 
SAA agreement with Macedonia in April 2001, with Croatia in October 2001, and with 
Albania late January 2003). In regard to this logic, reform assistance and closer relations 
will be granted to countries that have already managed to fulfill the basic criteria, while 
the countries which are behind in the reform process or which exhibit “Stabilization 
deficits” will not be qualified for the conditional EU offers.  
 The Stabilization or the pre-accession process creates new difficulties among the 
countries of the region. It deepens the gap between the advanced and the less advanced, 
the stabilized and the “problematic” countries, increasing the frontiers between the poor 
and the rich, the secure and the insecure countries, undermining the regional cooperation 
and accentuating the Balkan differences, which may generate new tensions in the 
                                                          
61 CARDS, p. 4.  
62 The Republic of Croatia submitted an application for EU membership, on the basis of Article 49 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, on 21 February 2003. The application will be dealt with according to the 
rules laid down in the Treaty on the European Union. The first step would be for the Council to ask the 
Commission to prepare a preliminary opinion on the question of whether and when accession negotiations 
should be started. 
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region63. The European institutions or the decision makers might enhance appropriate 
opportunities and defuse the present and the potential tensions of the region. The EU 
granted membership candidacy to Romania and Bulgaria, though both countries had 
fulfilled neither the minimum political nor the economic preconditions for the 
qualification. Nowadays both countries, especially Bulgaria, are progressing64. 
 The intervention of the North Atlantic Alliance in Kosova constrained the 
European Commission to grant EU membership candidacy to six other countries: the 
Helsinki six65. It was a political decision to avoid other tensions and to secure peace and 
democracy, the rule of law, and economic improvement throughout Europe. Thus, a 
political decision of the European Council to support a quick integration process over 
quality and economic conditions, giving the priority to stability and defusing the possible 
tensions, would be the shorter way to integrate the Western Balkans and to get rid of the 
“powder keg” ready to explode time and again.  
B.  THE NEW ROAD 
 The new road for the Western Balkans was drafted and strongly supported by 
Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom. These EU member countries, for political 
reasons, proposed full EU membership for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Kosova, Macedonia and the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) with the condition that 
democratic and economic reforms be undertaken. However, some of the EU countries did 
not endorse this proposal. 
 France, Italy, Luxembourg and the EU Commission opposed the German 
proposal, especially France. Paris feared that an improvement of relations with 
Macedonia and Albania could have a strong impact on Romania. France considered EU 
membership of the Western Balkans countries an unrealistic alternative. The French 
government was against a reference in the Stability Pact to Article 49 of the Amsterdam 
                                                          
63 WB, March 2000 and The Road to Stability and Prosperity in Southeastern Europe, A regional Strategy 
Paper, World Bank, 1 March 2000. 
64 EU Action in support of the Stability Pact and South-Eastern Europe, Brussels, December, 1999; EC, 
Progress Reports on Romania's EU Accession, Brussels, 8 November 2000 and EC, Progress Reports on 
Bulgaria's EU Accession, Brussels, 8 November 2000. 
65 The Helsinki Six are a group of six EU candidate countries, namely Bulgaria (application date: 
December of 1995), Latvia (application date: October 1995), Lithuania (application date: December of 
1995), Malta (application date; July 1990), Romania (application date: June 1995) and Slovakia 
(application date: June 1995). 
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Treaty, since this would give the impression of a direct invitation to apply for EU 
membership66.  
 For quite different motives, even Spain and Portugal did not favor EU 
membership for the Western Balkans. These countries do not have any political interest 
in the region, but they were concerned about loosing the EU financial assistance, which 
would be given to the new future members at their expenses. At the Council meeting in 
Brussels on 17 May 1999 a compromise was reached in a document called “Common 
Position”67. 
 Since that date, the Western Balkans have been engaged in this new policy, and 
all the region’s states have progressed despite what they inherited from the past and 
despite the collapse of their economies from the conflict. All Western Balkans countries 
are seriously committed to achieve the requirements of the Stabilization and Association 
process and, according to the latest report of the EU68, stability has been restored and 
security has improved throughout the region. The reforms aiming at improving the 
economy and the social life of the region are proceeding in many sectors, a considerable 
number of refugees and displaced persons have returned home and the work to heal the 
wounds of the ten-year war has started throughout the region. But corruption and 
organized crime remain high in all the countries of the region. 
 The government of each Western Balkan state is democratically elected. The new 
regional political parties and their leaders have understood that democracy produces 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and they accept their status because democracy will give them 
other opportunities to try again to win. The political reform is pointing out every day that 
the democratic institutions of the state, under certain conditions and from time to time in 
the competition of interests and values, will offer to the political forces of each country 
other possibilities to realize their interests, which is sufficient to motivate them to comply 
                                                          
66 Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (1997) goes as follows: "Any European State which 
respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the Union. […] The 
conditions of admission and the adjustment to the Treaties on which the Union is founded which such 
admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the Applicant State."  
67Council of the European Union, “Common Position of the Council concerning a stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe,” Official Journal of the European Communities, L133, 1-2, 17 May 1999. 
68Second Annual Report of the Stabilization and Association process for Southeast Europe, Commission of 
the European Communities, Brussels, March 2003. 
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with the undesirable result and to respect the rule of law69. This process is building the 
confidence that even the ‘losers’ under democracy are better off than in a future under 
nondemocratic alternatives. On the other hand this process goes beyond that. It makes 
clear that elections are an important part of the treatment for what ails a country, but they 
are neither an overnight nor a guaranteed cure. They are not sufficient by themselves to 
guarantee that democracy becomes a permanent condition of national life. In some cases, 
such as in the latest elections of BiH, they became a vehicle to power of nationalist and 
separatist politicians and political parties.  
 On 5 October 2002, in BiH ethnic-based parties won. Their victory may aggravate 
the divisions in BiH and may make the European progress more difficult, but the 
democratic process is still better than any alternative70. If leaders with popular support are 
not given opportunities at the ballot box, they may well resort, once again, to bullets. As 
H. L. Mencken put it, in one of his less dyspeptic comments on the subject, "The cure for 
the evils of democracy is more democracy." No society can easily or quickly transform 
the way it governs itself. Tearing down the communist past is much easier than building 
strong democratic institutions in the Western Balkans71.   
 Albania, after the turmoil caused by the fall of the financial schemes in 1997, has 
steadily advanced to improve the overall political and economic situation and to 
consolidate the rule of law and order. It is succeeding in reforming the economic and 
social life, and in opening the country to the region and to the EU. The stable political 
situation in Albania and the democratic conduct of the political forces opened the road to 
the negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU at the end of 
January 2003.  
                                                          
69 Perzeworski, A., Sustainable Democracy, pp 19-33, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
70 Since the conclusion of GFAP, BiH has had numerous elections organized and supervised and run by the 
OSCE: general elections in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002; municipal elections in 1997 and 2000 and special 
elections for the RS National Assembly in 1997. The new election law is adopted and there is a permanent 
Election Commission (Annex 3, of GFAP). Although Nationalists scored a clean sweep of Bosnia’s 
tripartite presidency in the elections of 5 October 2002, their showings can by no means be described as 
triumphs. The low turn out of 55% (a drop of 10% from the last elections) indicates the voters want their 
elected officials to get on with the business of establishing an effective government that improves the 
economy, social services, and quality of life. The lack of a clear winner by the nationalist parties in the race 
for Bosnia’s central parliament and for the assemblies of the country’s two autonomous halves (the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbs´ Republika Srpska) will require the nationalists to form a coalition 
with the moderate parties leading to a more reformist government.  
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 Bosnia and Herzegovina is trying to surmount the legacy of a bloody civil war, is 
proceeding with reforms, and is making efforts to strengthen the efficiency of the 
government72. The Road Map compiled by the European Union purposely to get BiH 
closer to EU is substantially complete and the European Commission will prepare a 
feasibility study on Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to negotiate and conclude, even 
with this country, a Stabilization and Association Agreement73.  
 Croatia is the most developed country of the region. It opened the negotiations in 
December 2001 and from that date on has implemented a plan to fulfill the requirement 
of the Stabilization and Association Agreements at an accelerated speed. This Western 
Balkans country is looking forward to its EU membership. 
 The new state of Macedonia was proceeding until the crisis of 2001. On 9 April 
2001 Macedonia was invited to enter the Stabilization and Association process without 
fulfilling the conditions required at the end of the first phase. It was a rapid decision for 
political purposes: to encourage the government of Macedonia to take the necessary 
political steps to defuse the ethnic tensions and to resolve the conflict peacefully74. After 
the agreement of Ohrid75 and the early elections, Macedonia is trying to find compromise 
solutions76. The Stabilization process is advancing.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
71  Talbot, S., "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, No 6, 1996.  
72 Dayton established BiH as a highly decentralized state. Dayton gave extensive powers to two new 
entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and only limited and specific 
powers to BiH’s common institutions. The Entities enjoy wide powers, but are characterized by asymmetric 
structures. RS is centralized, FBiH decentralized. RS is divided into municipalities, but most powers are 
centralized in Banja Luka. The highly decentralized structure of the BiH State coupled with persistent 
ethnic polarization has often blocked effective government. Calls to “re-open Dayton” have (justifiably) 
been treated with caution, but the international community has repeatedly urged the Entities to “build on 
Dayton.” RS have resisted such calls [Dayton Accords]. 
73 The Road Map includes economic steps, such as to abolish payment bureaux, establish a state treasury, 
implement foreign direct investment legislation and adopt restitution legislation, which are completed; 
remove all trade barriers between the entities, establish a single BiH national institute for standards and 
adopt law on competition and consumer protection, which are in progress (Second annual report …).  
74 Patten, Ch.: Southeast Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), Skopje, 23 February 2000. 
75 On 8 August 2001 in Ohrid, the leaders of the Republic of Macedonia’s main political parties, that since 
13 May 2001 had formed a shaky ‘National Unity Government’, reached an agreement aimed at ending the 
violent conflict within the country.  
76 Lubco Georgievski, the chairman of the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE and former Prime Minister of 
Macedonia (until September 2002), publicly stated his plan to divide Macedonia according to ethnic lines 
in late April of this year. Macedonian Prime Minister Cervenkovski, and the EU and U.S. representatives in 
Skopje strongly reacted against Georgievski’s proposal, calling it terribly unacceptable scenarios. The 
Albanian government supports the Macedonian government against the secessionist ideas of Macedonian 
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 Serbia and Montenegro have demonstrated determination to make a break with 
their past and engage in a process of political and socioeconomic transition. On 14 March 
2002 they realized a loose federation, committing themselves to necessary constitutional 
restructuring and regional relations. The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic 
was a dark sign for Serbia, for the region and democratic progress, but the Serbian 
government handled the situation quietly. The European Commission and its leaders are 
treating very carefully Serbia and Montenegro, granting them the most assistance they 
possibly can, and the date to open the negotiations for a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro is not far away. 
 Kosova is still under the administration of the UN (UNMIC) and UN resolution 
1244. The political parties and the government that emerged from the central elections of 
200177 are working to reach the standards before the final status.   
 In 2002, the economic78 growth of the Western Balkans was close to 4% (the 
growth of the world economy was about 2.5%). However, unemployment is notably high, 
ranging from about 15% in Albania to 40% in BiH. Inflation declined at 6%. Only in the 
federation of Serbia and Montenegro does the inflation rate have double figures, but it is 
declining quickly.  
 The economic growth of the region shows a sustained increase in the productive 
capacity of the economy of the Western Balkans, and it also underlies a slight rise in the 
standard of living. After the ten-year war, this growth means an increase in the inputs to 
production, and an increase in the efficiency of use of a given quality of inputs. Modestly 
speaking, these two elements may be considered as quantity versus quality-driven 
growth, which may be understood as first, we have an increase in capital and labor in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
nationalist politicians, rejecting them as regressive and pointing out that the integrity of Macedonia is very 
important for the stability in the region.  
The EU and the U.S. stated that they don’t see any other solution but the implementation of the Ohrid 
agreement and invited all political forces to join the government in its effort on the road to European 
integration and regional cooperation.  
77 The OSCE Mission in Kosova has organized and supervised the municipal elections of 2000 and 2002 
and the central elections of 2002, which have been qualified as free and fair by local and international 
observers. This year, the OSCE's Department of Elections will face a different challenge, the handover of 
responsibilities to local institutions.  
78 It should be recalled that the reliability of statistics from the region is generally poor. Because of the grey 
market, growth rates, levels of unemployment and other economic data should thus be interpreted 
cautiously. 
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region, and second, the economy of the Western Balkans makes more efficient use of a 
given level of inputs.  
 In all the countries of the Western Balkans the fiscal situation is improved, apart 
from Serbia and Montenegro, but it still remains vulnerable. The general deficit is about 
6% of GDP in 2002, so to reduce dependence on external financing and expenditure, the 
Western Balkans should strengthen control and increase tax collection.  
 From the early nineties the Western Balkans demolished the centralized economy 
and adopted market economy reforms, but structural reforms are still needed to turn the 
region into fully functioning market economies. As far as privatization is concerned, all 
the countries are making progress, with Albania in the lead. The privatization and 
structuring of small and medium sized enterprises is proceeding quite well, while the 
privatization and restructuring of large enterprises is still slow. In this regard, the loose 
federation of Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia are doing well. The banking system 
is also progressing and the necessary confidence is increasing, but its support for the 
reconstruction of the region is not sufficient, the lending system still not strong enough, 
not strong enough to assist the small and medium sized enterprises, which represent the 
fundamental elements of the Western Balkans economy. The present situation calls for 
the governments of the region to take responsible steps to improve their institutional and 
financial environment according to the European Charter for Small Enterprises.  
 Despite the global economic downturn, trade continued to grow in the region 
(imports increased 17%, exports, 13%). The major trade partner of the Western Balkans 
is the EU and it represents almost 55% of the Western Balkans’ total trade. The trade 
range of the countries varies from some 45% for Macedonia and BiH to about 80% for 
Albania. Nevertheless, the Western Balkans exports to the EU are low, about 0.5% of 
total EU imports. The imports of the region double its exports increasing its trade deficits 
(from 20% of GDP in Serbia and Montenegro to about 45% of GDP in BiH). However, 
the inflow of private remittances, official transfers and a positive balance of trade in 
services has decreased the regional deficit to about 7% of GDP [all the figures used are 
taken from the 2002 report of the European Commission].  
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 The conclusion and implementation of free trade agreements between the 
countries of the Western Balkans will remove all trade barriers, and the economists and 
the politicians of the region believe that completely unrestricted commerce without 
export and import duties, quantitative restrictions, and regulations that are clearly 
designed to reduce or prevent such trade, will enable the economies of the region.  
 After a decade of transition and war, the freedom of movement for people, goods 
and services, money and information is introducing the Western Balkans to the 
globalization process. This has been exceptionally difficult for all the peoples of this 
region. At this first step almost all the countries of the region are facing great difficulties, 
but they understand that globalization is not just a phenomenon and not just a passing 
trend. It is the international system that replaced the Cold War system to which the 
Western Balkans belonged, and it has one overarching feature: integration [Friedman, p. 
8]. As a matter of fact, all Western Balkans actors decided to cooperate in order to reach 
their future European goals79.  
 Many scholars find that open economies grow faster and are the main 
distinguishing characteristic of most successful developing economies. Economies, like 
the Western Balkans, that have open and large neighbors grow faster, but the size of 
closed neighboring economies is of no account, and economies that have open and 
developed neighbors also grow faster, but again the level of development of closed 
neighboring economies is not important. One key finding is that Western Balkans 
countries may benefit from being located close to the large, developed open European 
economies80. On the other hand, Albania and Croatia are members of the WTO. In 2002 
Macedonia completed its WTO accession negotiations, while BiH and Serbia and 
Montenegro started theirs. But the countries of the region need to improve their 
                                                          
79 According to a recent Word Bank report, the beneficiaries are the more globalized developing countries, 
5% growth rate, and the industrialized world, 2% growth rate. The losers were the less globalized 
developing countries. The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2001 shows that by far most inward FDI 
(over $1 trillion or more than three quarters in the year 2000) has been placed in industrialized countries. 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions remain the main stimulus behind FDI, and these are still 
concentrated in the developed countries. In the same year $240 billion were invested in developing 
countries. Only 2% ($27 billion) were directed to Central and Eastern Europe (Skocpol, Th., Bringing the 
state back in, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
80 Schiff, M. and Winters, A.L., "Dynamics and Politics in Regional Integration Arrangements,” The World 
Bank Economic Review, v. 12, No. 2, pp. 177-196, May 1998. 
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infrastructure, customs and institutional capacity in order to fully profit from trade 
liberalization in the framework of the WTO.  
 In 2002, foreign direct investments (FDI)81 in the region were about €2.2 billion, 
almost 4.5% of the Western Balkan’s GDP (€90 in per capita terms). Croatia has taken 
half of the FDI-s to the region (€230 per capita). In comparison, the inflow of FDI to the 
ten candidate countries to join the EU in 200482 was equal to about 5% of their GDP 
(€250 per capita in 2001). As a matter of fact, FDI is not enough to finance the Western 
Balkans countries’ deficits (apart from Croatia). However, experience shows that to 
attract FDI, political stability and democracy, the rule of law, a developed infrastructure, 
an educated workforce, business culture, and geographical location are more important 
than fiscal benefits and cheap labor. Nevertheless, the transnationality index83 shows that 
even the countries of the Western Balkans are moving ahead, leaving behind other parts 
of Europe: Czech Republic – 18 (member of the EU in 2004), Croatia – 13 (Western 
Balkans), Lithuania – 12 (member of the EU in 2004), Slovenia – 7 (member of the EU 
in 2004), Serbia and Montenegro – 5 (Western Balkans), Macedonia 5 (Western 
Balkans), Albania – 5 (Western Balkans), Russia--5, Belarus 3, BiH – 2 (Western 
Balkans)84. As shown before, several macroeconomic indicators of the present Western 
Balkans economy are gradually progressing. Growth is sustained, inflation is being 
brought under control and trade is increasing.  
C.  A STRATEGIC OPTION 
 Since the EU has opened a long-term accession perspective for the countries of 
the Western Balkans, scholars, specialists, politicians, and decision makers have 
                                                          
81 Foreign direct investment is a key ingredient in economic growth. It can impact the host economy 
through a variety of channels: by adding to investable resources and capital formation; by transferring 
technology, skills, innovative capacity, and organizational and managerial practices between countries; and 
by accessing international marketing networks. Still, these positive effects may vary in their magnitude 
depending on the quality of the business environment in the host economy and the characteristics of the 
multinational company. Researchers have focused on measuring these effects and finding ways to 
maximize the beneficial aspects. 
82 The ten new EU members are Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Malta, and Cyprus (only the Greek part, the two thirds of the island). 
83 The transnationality index is defined as the average of FDI inflows as percentage of gross fixed capital 
formation, FDI inward stock as percentage of GDP, value added of foreign affiliates as percentage of GDP, 
and employment of foreign affiliates as percentage of total employment.  
84 Temsch, R., Global information society and its Impact on the Economy of South-East Europe, 
OSCE/CSS Seminar, “Economic Aspects of Security”, 13 September 2002.  
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understood that some form of inclusion of the region in the EU enlargement process is 
the most promising and cost-effective way of defusing tensions and promoting security, 
stability and prosperity, both for the region and for Europe as a whole.  
 However, the present accession procedure is long, complicated and drawn out 
with ample scope for difficulties to arise and for individual member states and EU 
institutions to delay or even sabotage the process85. In order to be acceptable as members, 
applicant countries have to fulfill a number of criteria, including the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. They must adopt the acquis communautaire – the existing rules, 
regulations and agreements of the EU. They must have functioning market economies as 
well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the 
EU. They must have adequate legal and administrative systems in the public and private 
sectors. They must have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union; i.e., new members are 
required to subscribe to the emerging acquis politique, that is, the developing common 
foreign and defense policy, and to the finalité politique, the long term objective of the 
EU. Only one of these requirements was laid down in the Treaty of Rome – that new 
members should be ‘European’. Other criteria ‘evolved’ during the course of the first EU 
enlargement86. 
 Taking into account the region’s unequal capabilities, the financial burden of 
reconstruction and stabilization as well as the potentially counter-productive effects of 
EU initiatives for the region, several experts and research institutes believe that the 
problems of the Western Balkans can be better solved by including all countries of the 
region in the same process of EU enlargement. This idea, expressed in different forms, 
requires a quick solution for the difficult situation of the region. This policy is based on 
the economic strength of the EU and the very small economic proportions of the Western 
Balkans, which have not caused any problem so far (The Western Balkans GDP equals 
                                                          
85 The most notorious case is the behavior of France towards Britain, which vetoed the British application 
during the 1960s but, equally, it was France to support Greece in the 1970s and make of this country a 
member of the EU in 1981 without reaching the EU standards.   
86 Copenhagen Criteria, 1993 and Croft, S., Redmond, J., Wyn Rees, G., and Webber, M., The Enlargement 
of Europe, p. 61-62, Manchester University Press, 1999. 
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some €50 billion, and the average per capita income in the region equals €2000. Croatia 
is the largest economy with a GDP of some €23 billion). The real economic burden for 
the EU of an accelerated economic integration of the Western Balkans would be very 
small. It would be quite small compared with the expenses foreseen for the region 
through the Stability Pact, Stabilization and Association Process, and CARDS program. 
The overall bilateral and multilateral assistance to Southeastern Europe (which includes 
Romania and Bulgaria) amounted to approximately € 6 billion in 1999, more than the € 
6.6 billion in both 2000 and in 200187. 
 These proposals have in common a priority for economic rather than political or 
civil-society incentives and a preference for European solutions over bilateral support for 
reform efforts or intraregional cooperation.  
 Partial membership would introduce a model of enlargement “light” for the 
Western Balkans if the EU accepted compromises in the adoption of the acquis88 and if 
the countries of the region gave up some of the principal rights of full membership. EU 
accession does not provide any instant solution to all Western Balkans problems and, in 
particular, does not, in itself, guarantee economic success. However, EU membership 
offers a chance to attract the foreign investment and EU financial aid desperately 
needed89 to generate economic development and enhanced growth. In so doing, the whole 
region could move quite soon to free trade, to a customs union, to a currency dependent 
on the Euro, and eventually to the Euro currency90. As a matter of fact, the quick partial 
integration of the region in the EU (for example, in the next round of enlargement) would 
have a number of obvious advantages; but the Union, before taking this decision, should 
modify the Copenhagen Criteria.   
 In establishing the market mechanism, the legal and institutional basic structures 
for private investments (especially in the FRY, Bosnia and Kosova), partial integration 
would prevent the Western Balkan economy from depending on state subventions or 
international assistance. It would prevent the weak governments of the region from 
                                                          
87 European Commission, CARDS, p. 11-41.  
88 Milestones in the Relations between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, European 
Union External Relations, Brussels, June 2001. 
89 The European assistance is decreasing year by year. 
90 Stability Pact Infrastructure projects: Implementation Status as of October 2000, 18 October 2000. 
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abandoning or slowing down the program of reforms (the assassination of the Serbian 
Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic is a strong push in that direction). Partial integration 
would have a strong positive impact on the intraregional trade and on bilateral relations 
with the EU because the borders would be open for free movement for people and 
goods91. 
  In 2004 the ten newcomers will have a strong impact on the three most sensitive 
issues of the EU: institutional, financial and policy issues. First, the new ten will affect 
the size of the Commission and the Parliament and will affect the voting system for the 
Council of Ministers, because of the uneasy balance of representation in those 
institutions92. Efficiency dictates that the European Commission should not grow beyond 
a certain size and that it is already too big93. On the other hand, the European Parliament 
will increase from 646 (max 700) seats to 1,00094, and the Council of Ministers, the most 
powerful institution of the EU, the decision maker, will have twenty-five ministers. The 
implications of a Council of twenty-five ministers are always a source of concern95. 
However, the partial integration of the Western Balkans would not have any effect on the 
three institutions, namely the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, 
because the partial members could have an observer status. 
 Second, all the ten new members will be net beneficiaries from the EU budget. 
Moreover, while they may well receive a disproportionately high share of EU 
expenditures in virtually all policy areas, they will receive most of their funds via the 
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and the EUs structural funds, which account for 50 
                                                          
91 Fichler, F., The EU Enlargement: Our Partnership in Agriculture, International Ministerial Conference 
of the Central and Eastern European Countries, Brussels, 30 April 2000.  
92 The institutional reform which started at Amsterdam remains an ongoing and highly contentious 
question. 
93 The enlargement creates difficulties in the balance of portfolios, the directorates general, and new staff 
from the acceding countries (the absorption of new recruits is not an easy task when they lack experience in 
dealing with EU affairs).  
94 At the present time, a German Member of the European Parliament is elected by over thirteen times the 
number of voters (800,000) than a Member of the European Parliament from Luxembourg (60,000).  
95 When the Council makes decisions by qualified majority, votes are presently weighted as follows: 
Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom: 10 votes; Spain:  8 votes; Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, 
Portugal: 5 votes; Austria and Sweden: 4 votes; Denmark, Finland, Ireland: 3 votes; and Luxembourg: 2 
votes. In qualified majority voting, Commission proposals must receive 62 votes out of a total of 87 in 
order to be approved. To amend a Commission proposal without the Commission’s consent, unanimity 
among Council members is required. Prospective votes will be: Poland 8, Czech Republic 5, Slovakia 3, 
Hungary 5, Slovenia 3, Bulgaria 4, Romania 7, Lithuania 3, Latvia 2, Estonia 2, Malta 2, Cyprus 2. 
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per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, of the EU’s budget (CAP budget for 2003 is € 
44.78 billion out of € 99.685) because the new members are notably dependent on 
agriculture. In this context the newcomers may oppose any further quick enlargement 
because they would not want to receive less. However, the Western Balkans' share won’t 
be so much as to be a big concern. The EU budget for 2003 totals € 99.685 billion in 
commitment appropriations and € 97.503 billion in payment appropriations. The 
Cooperation with the Western Balkan countries is almost € 684,560,000 or 0.686% of 
member states' GNI. [Bulletin EU 12-2002, Budgets (2/12)]. 
 Third, as far as it concerns the third old policy issue ‘widening versus deepening’ 
dilemma, which goes back at least as far as the first EU summit at the Hague in 1969, 
partial membership of the Western Balkans won’t cause serious problems. Partial 
membership cannot create any potential conflict in the practical effects of the EU’s 
institutions. It may not impose strains on particular aspects of EU policy, because all the 
countries of the Western Balkans will have an observer status96.  
 Therefore, it would not have any impact on the decision-making and the working 
relationships of the EU member states, but it could raise a lot of objections because it 
would totally change the principle of enlargement and would disregard the conditionality 
posed for the Luxembourg Six97 and the Helsinki Six. It might place into question the 
process of enlargement as a whole, and, from this perspective, it might cause problems; 
but the bottom line is that it would be less expensive, and it would defuse tensions 
throughout the Balkans, and the “powder keg” of Europe would cease to exist.     
 
 
    
                                                          
96 Croft, S., Redmond, J., Wyn Rees, G., and Webber, M., The enlargement of Europe, pp 68-78, 
Manchester University Press, 1999.  
97 The so-called Luxembourg Six are six EU candidate countries: Cyprus (application date: July 1990), the 
Czech Republic (application date: 1996), Estonia (application date: November 1995), Hungary (application 
date: March 1994), Poland (application date: April 1994), and Slovenia (application date: 1996). 
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IV. A QUICK ADMISSION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION OF THE 
                    WESTERN BALKANS 
A.  A NEW INTEGRATION POLICY FOR THE WESTERN BALKANS  
The integration policy, which would grant to individual states or to the whole 
region of the Western Balkans an observer status in the European Union institutions, 
might be based on the present European initiatives for the states of the region and on the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. It would further help and commit 
individual Western Balkan countries in their preparation for EU integration. It could 
group other initiatives and forms of cooperation around the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements, and would further contribute to the realization of the Stability Pact. It would 
extend the European Economic Area, trade facilitation, free trade agreements (similar to 
those of the member or candidate states) and introduce the EURO throughout the 
Western Balkans98.  
Some of the above elements, especially the ones concerning trade, could be 
implemented throughout the region, thereby enhancing regional cooperation between EU 
candidate states (Slovenia, Rumania, and Bulgaria) and the Western Balkans. Thus, this 
different integrating policy would not damage the conditionality of the EU pre- accession 
process. This different model would speed the integration process in the Western 
Balkans, creating real prospects for both political and economic success. At the same 
time this policy would be able to manage the expectations and the apprehensions that 
have emerged in different Balkan states.  
The European Commission provided a new policy for the Western Balkans 
(approved by the Amsterdam Treaty): A Common Strategy for the Western Balkans, but 
there are rumors in Europe that the Stability Pact prevented the realization of such a 
strategy.  
As noted above, the policy of ‘partial integration’ or ‘observer status’ is not 
against the previous initiatives but it reorganizes the Stability Pact, the Stabilization and 
Association Process, the CARDS-program, the Europe-Agreements and Accession 
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Partnerships creating a new framework and a clear picture for the conditions and steps of 
each phase99.  
The Stability Pact is an intergovernmental policy, but this new model, aiming to 
underpin a Common Strategy, is based on another simple fact: the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the EU, the Stability Pact itself, the Enlargement, Development, Trade 
and Humanitarian Aid which are operating in the region. From this perspective, this 
integration policy for the Western Balkans involves the EU as a whole in regard to other 
organizations concerned. This strategy brings together the policies of the Stability Pact, 
which are bound for regional cooperation and the Stabilization and Association process, 
which is oriented towards conditionality and bilateral negotiations, focusing on concrete 
options and policy areas. The coordination of both initiatives may outline a functional 
cooperation program for the EU institutions, other organizations and for the governments 
of the Western Balkans100. 
The main opposition could come from the ten new comers from Eastern Europe 
(including Bulgaria and Rumania, although foreseen for 2006). They represent a large 
population and territory - some 105 million people within an area of 1.1 million square 
kilometers, or 28 per cent of the current EU population and 33 per cent of its present area 
- and the economy of the largest countries is notably based on agriculture. The accession 
of the ten countries will increase total agricultural land by 50 per cent and the EU's farm 
labor force would double in size101. As a matter of fact, estimates have varied widely, 
ranging as low as EUR 10 billion for all ten candidates to as high as EUR 35-40 billion 
per year just to bring Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the EU.  
 The partial accession of the Western Balkans may decrease the funds they get 
from the CAP, which is a system of set agricultural prices and subsidies created to 
respond to European market instability and deficiencies as well as the political power that 
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agriculture and farmers command in Europe102. This situation leads to the conclusion that 
some kind of major reform of the CAP is inevitable103. Due to the successful policies in 
developing and protecting European agriculture, the CAP has become a highly 
institutionalized program, resistant to change and reform despite the agricultural market 
distortion, overproduction and increasing costs that it eventually generated and now 
sustains. But it seems not to resist to the new round of enlargement and it got to change.  
 While the CAP and the debates surrounding it are well known, the other major 
source of opposition could be generated by the cohesion and structural funds (CSF), 
which emerged out of the Single European Act of 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty of 
1993. However, within the domestic context of the EU the CSF are equally controversial, 
resulting from the amount of funds spent in this area and questions about how effective 
this category of support has been. The new enlargement will affect the CSF in a number 
of different ways.   
 The primary goal of the CSF is to help bring less developed regions of the EU up 
to the Union standard. The structural funds are the much larger category than the 
cohesion one (The 2003 budget allocates some EUR 34 billion for both categories and 
some EUR 2,839 billion out of 34 go to the cohesion funds). The structural funds 
concentrate on such areas as industrial decline, low population density and rural areas, 
high unemployment, infrastructure, education, integration of youth into the labor market 
and the retraining of workers, while the cohesion are foreseen for environmental and 
transportation projects. The CAP and the CSF are considered as the essential element of 
the European integration.  
 According to the EU statistics, over 60 per cent of the structural funds are targeted 
at specific geographical regions at the sub state level in a structural fund category known 
as Objective 1 (this category allocates some EUR 21,577 billion for 2003). Under the 
current system, to qualify for Objective 1 funding the regional GDP must be less than 75 
per cent of the EU average over the previous three years104. Within this framework, a 
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number of countries are eligible for CSF support: Greece, Ireland and Portugal qualify at 
the national level for Objective 1 funds, while specific regions qualify in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The 
present CSF's supports half of the EU's population, which is currently eligible for 
assistance under the CSF. In this context, it creates strong local support and would 
prevent the reform of these funds105. This opposition would endanger the policy of the 
quick inclusion of the Western Balkans in the good family they belong or they believe to 
belong. On the other hand both the CAP and the CSF have been criticized by some as 
largely ineffective in stimulating development, as inefficient and as prone to fraud106.  
 The enlargement with new ten members will change dramatically the circulation 
of the CSF because these funds are allotted on the basis of a region’s GDP relative to the 
EU standard, and all the new comers are eligible to CSF. According to calculations based 
on EU data, the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia 
would lower the EU per capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity) to approximately EUR 
15,736 from its current average of 17,260; inclusion of all ten eastern European 
applicants would lower the average further to just over EUR 14,727. At either level, it 
can be estimated that many of the current regions and the nations that benefit from 
Objective 1 funding would lose much or all of their support even upon the first wave of 
accession, with further losses upon the subsequent entry of other members. For example, 
some studies have noted that upon accession of all ten eastern European states virtually 
all Spanish regions currently supported by these funds would likely lose their subsidies, 
as would France's overseas departments and Corsica107. Others have anticipated that 
Belgium, Northern Ireland and even eastern Germany will lose their Objective 1 benefits 
upon the first wave of accession108. Cohesion funds, which currently are available only to 
states with a GNP of less than 90 per cent of the EU average (Ireland, Greece, Portugal 
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and Spain), will also be threatened109. While CSF outlays are expected to rise in the 
future, reforms in anticipation of enlargement mean that the total percentage of the EU 
population eligible for such aid is expected to fall by as much as 15 per cent, only with 
the ten eastern, which is certain to generate widespread opposition to reform110. The 
partial integration of the Western Balkans will make worse the situation and would 
generate opposition. 
 However, the sudden and dramatic collapse of communism in eastern Europe in 
1989 marked not only the end of the cold war division of Europe, but also most com-
monly held assumptions regarding the nature of Europe and the future of the region. The 
notions of a ‘return to Europe’ and a ‘common European house’ emerged as powerful 
concepts, particularly in the Western Balkans, where the long separation from the next 
door west and the bloody wars inherited from a common unpleasant past, sometimes even 
as a result of the unfinished political games of the great powers conflicting in the region, 
is typically viewed as a historical dead-end which demands correction. If we look back to 
the Europe’s historical past, we can find amazing facts from the Western Balkans that 
give credit to that idea.  For instance, in spring of 1457 a huge Turkish army of some 
80,000 men, commanded by the famous general Isaac bey Evrenos, set out for Albania. 
In September of the same year George Kastriote (Skenderbeg111) launched a sudden 
assault on them, routed them completely and captured thousands of prisoners, including 
the traitor Hamza Kastriote, his nephew112. The courts of Europe congratulated the 
Albanian leader on his new victory (he fought against the Turks for twenty five years 
consequently). Pope Calixtus III showered him with praises and titles of honor. A few 
months later he wrote to George Kastriote: “I thank the Lord for having placed you in 
these lands, which might have given free passage to the cruel and treacherous enemy to 
march on Christendom; you, like a cannon and a powerful rampart, to keep him in 
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check.” And he added: “Ah! If only we had many more Christian princes as valiant as 
you!”113. But these valiant Christian princes and peoples were left in their miserable fate 
and suffered their faith, culture and legacy for almost five hundred years under a terrible 
foreign yoke coming from foreign lands. They defended the Christendom as much as they 
could, but during five centuries of invasion and interminable wars and fights some of 
them, tiered of life under the invader, lost their faith and got another one114. 
 However, the partial integration or the observer status will put to an end the 
concept strengthened after the Informal European Council Meeting of Athens, 16 April 
2003, where the new ten signed the Treaty of Accession, that the peoples of the Western 
Balkans or the states are largely relegated to the status of poor relations or of ‘failed’ 
peoples. 
B.  THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 
 In a European strategy aimed at alleviating the tensions between regionality and 
conditionality by means of functional differentiation, a European Economic Area115 
might play a decisive role. In a free trade area the states of the Western Balkans will 
remove all barriers to trade (tariffs, quotas, or other governmental impediments to 
international trade), and in a customs union they would adopt uniform tariffs on goods 
and services from outside the union. Free trade would allow each country to specialize in 
the goods that it can produce cheaply and efficiently relative to the other countries of the 
area. Such specialization could enable all Western Balkans state to achieve higher real 
incomes. On the other hand, the present situation of border controls and customs tariffs 
perpetuate an infamous bureaucratic corruption and hamper cross-border cooperation. 
The abolition would be the solution, but therefore greater assistance to improve law 
enforcement, judiciary and border controls with training, institution building and 
adequate equipment is indispensable.  
 There is another important fact to be noticed, the one that the larger benefits 
potentially available are damaged by the CAP for it allows free trade in high-priced 
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agricultural goods within the Community by excluding potential low-priced imports from 
outside. Community countries subsidize the domestic production of agricultural goods 
despite their comparative disadvantage. Consumers pay high prices as the EU collude to 
maintain trade-diverting tariffs on cheap imports. Thus, the CAP and the customs union 
show the two faces of the EU, one that enhances efficiency by promoting competition 
and specialization, and one that sacrifices economic efficiency to help farmers. So at the 
first steps of their ingress to the European Free Trade area the Western Balkans state will 
lose, but, on the other hand, it will be a stimulus to strengthen their economy and to find 
their way out.  So, although free trade provides overall benefits, it will hurt some people 
in the region, most particularly the shareholders and employees of industries who would 
lose money and jobs because they would lose sales to imported goods. Some of the 
groups to be hurt by foreign competition would try to exert political power to obtain 
protection against imports, but they won’t be able to delay it.  
 Despite the EU’s Stability Pact and Stabilization and Association Process, it will 
take the countries of the Western Balkans decades to fulfill the economic conditions of 
the Copenhagen Criteria. Growing social asymmetries, economic crises and 
criminalization at the very border of the European Union, moreover, would pose a serious 
threat to the stability and prosperity of Europe as a whole116. Integrating the five Western 
Balkan states in a Free Trade Area117 might be an option, but it would require a strategic 
choice on the part of the EU. A new Southeast European Free Trade Area might be 
created to act as an EU partner in trade regulations and cooperation negotiations.  
 While virtually all economists think free trade is desirable, they differ on how best 
to make the transition from tariffs and quotas to free trade, i.e.: unilateral, multilateral, or 
bilateral. In the case of the Western Balkans unilateral granting of trade preferences by 
the EU, as an alternative, might be most effective, if it also includes the far protected 
segments of agricultural production118.  
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 The advantage of unilateral free trade is that a country can reap the benefits of 
free trade immediately. However, multilateral and bilateral may have advantages over 
unilateral approaches but there is another concern. The greater reliance, on a bilateral or 
regional approach to trade liberalization may undermine and supplant, instead of support 
and complement, the multilateral GATT approach119.  
 Nevertheless, this policy will deprive the governments of the Western Balkans to 
address their own macroeconomic problems. But a major study by the World Bank shows 
that income grows more rapidly in countries open to international trade than in those 
more closed to trade.  
 Including the Western Balkans in a European Free Trade area means to extend the 
European Schengen120 border further on, as well. Including the Western Balkans in 
Schengen area it means to remove all controls at internal land of the Western Balkans, at 
the sea ports of the region uniting both coasts of the Adriatic Sea, and airport frontiers as 
well. It will guarantee the free movement to the peoples of the region through the 
European Free Trade Area.  
 The present state of art emerges another concern. It separates Slovenia, Romania 
and Bulgaria from the Western Balkans because they are (Slovenia and Bulgaria) or will 
be soon (Romania) part of the Schengen arrangements. In this way the EU outer border 
would put an end to the Slovenian-Croatian Free Trade Agreement. At this point, a 
conflict of interests between Eastern enlargement and the stabilization of the Western 
Balkans has to be resolved. There may be different ways, but one of them could be by 
enhancing the autonomous trade preferences with the states of the region121. 
C. GOOD GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTION 
 All the countries of the region have embarked on strengthening democratic 
process and institutions, including respect for the rule of law and human rights. There are 
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obvious weaknesses, but the commitment is there and is in part attributable to the 
countries having been embraced in the EU integration process.  
 The process has not cured the Western Balkans of many of its pressing political 
and social problems. The region faces a number of common challenges which require 
determined action on the domestic level, in the context of regional and European 
cooperation in order to lay the foundations of modern, well-governed states enjoying 
good neighborly relations.  
 The economic development of the Western Balkans, social inclusion and regional 
stability will depend on strong institutions and good governance, which should be able to 
fight and decrease the high level of corruption and organized crime in the area. The 
integration policy requires stronger institutional structures in the Western Balkans, able to 
fulfill the economic and political conditions of the European association process, and to 
implement the "acquis communitaire."  
 Strong institutions are able to manage economic difficulties by assisting their 
people, including the poor122. Institutions that represent all the citizens and treat their 
problems are able to decrease tensions which are still present in the multiethnic Western 
Balkans society (except for Albania).123  
 Institutional weaknesses in the Western Balkans are often expressed in different 
ways, such as calls to reopen the Dayton accords; the victory of nationalists in Bosnia 
(On 5 October 2002); Serbian support for extremists in Republica Serpska and Kosova, 
the unrest generated in Macedonia, resistance to create the necessary facilities for 
displaced persons, resistance to comply with the decisions of the supreme court in 
Republica Serpska, the assassination of high political personalities such as the former 
Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, corruption, luck of law and order, organized 
crime, etc.124 It is expressed through the language used by the political opposition, 
especially during electoral campaigns. In this regard, strong institutions are the basic 
element for the integration of the Western Balkans, and the success of the European 
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initiatives, such as the Stabilization and Association process, the Stability Pact and the 
CARDS program or any other regional policy that have to be realized through domestic 
institutions, such as INTERREG III A125. Their effectiveness can be seen in the 
development of a prosperous market economy, the reduction of unemployment, the 
management of public finances and public services, the efficient fight against corruption 
and organized crime, and the protection of the citizen, as well.   
 Throughout the region the function of the Parliaments is very much improved, but 
the lack of democratic culture is still causing problems especially in the hot spots of the 
area as in BiH, Republica Serpska, Macedonia and elsewhere. In this respect, the political 
parties are a major concern. They have a strong impact on the function and proceedings 
of the parliament, and on good governance, as well.  
 The political parties and the parliamentary committees are the two pillars where 
the members of the parliament put forth their activity. Although they are two different 
structures from the organization point of view, but the members of the parliament take 
part simultaneously in both structures. The coordination of both structures is fundamental 
because the political party and the parliamentary committee intersect in three main 
points: first, the members of the parliament are attached to deferent parliamentary 
committees by their political parties, second, the political party and the parliamentary 
committee direct the parliamentary debate, and third, the parliamentary committees are 
the places where the political parties may negotiate their differences. 
 During the political struggle to establish the democratic rule not all the political 
forces or the political groups of the region, which emerged after the fall of the communist 
rule, belonged to the pure democratic ideals. Some of them joined the democratic 
movement only as a means to destroy their rivals. As soon as the democratic rule and the 
democratic institutions were established they tried to use them for their own interest 
under the “national interest”. The partial integration of the Western Balkans in the EU 
will make the European politically likely minded forums as European People’s Parties 
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(the right wing) or the political group of the European Socialists (the left wing) more 
responsible to the likely minded parties from the Western Balkans. Their influence and 
cooperation will be very fruitful in improving the democratic culture and their behavior 
in the whole region. 
 Other important issues are: 
 Fragile or contested constitutional arrangements, which hinder the reforms and 
the implementation of the European initiatives in three countries of the area: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro126 and Macedonia. The BiH Entities are 
characterized by asymmetric structures: Republica Serbska is centralized while the FBiH 
is decentralized, and ethnic polarization often blocks effective government127. The Croat 
entity declared “self rule” in March 2001 and in mixed cantons the administration is 
divided in two. The EU and the U.S. treated with caution the request to “re-open 
Dayton”. They invited all parties to “build on Dayton” and not opening a new one. 
Republica Serbska opposed such calls. In Macedonia several constitutional articles 
triggered early 2001’s turmoil between the Macedonians and the Albanians, the two 
largest entities of this state. The partial integration would defuse tensions generated by 
nationalist feelings and help to restore a normal life. 
 Western Balkan countries have experienced difficulties in developing a culture in 
which the law governs all aspects of social life and be independent. The new Balkan 
states had to develop and strengthen the judicial institutions, the majority of which are 
still too weak to fight effectively the organized crime which tends to be part of the local 
political activity. In some countries, the procedural codes should be improved; court 
organizations should be changed, and judges, prosecutors and court clerks need to be 
trained. On the other hand, they should be better paid and protected.   
 Late this month (24 of April 2003) in Thessalonica, in a meeting with the 
Ministers of Justice and Order of the Western Balkans, the presidency of the EU decided 
to monitor their efforts and efficiency in the fight against organized crime in the region. 
As the coordinated fight against such a crime is one of the essential elements of the pre-
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accession process for the Western Balkans, the partial integration would be a remedy for 
the present situation, would secure the southeastern border of the EU and would spare 
Europe more money and efforts in organizing such meetings every week.  
 The situation of the minorities is much improved throughout the region but there 
is still room for improvement especially in the cases of missing persons and their right to 
property. While property repossession is progressing in BiH, with the largest number of 
refugees and displaced persons, it is still a problem in Croatia and Kosovo  
 Corruption is the widespread evil in the region. Its connection with organized 
crime undermines public confidence in the governments, which time and again lose the 
elections as it happened in Albania in 1997, in Macedonia in 2001, and Bosnia in 2002.  
 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) reports point 
out that slow bureaucratic procedures and corruption obstruct the normal development of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, many of which prefer to work in the gray economy 
(Bosnia takes the first place from the rest of the Western Balkans)128. There is a growing 
consensus among the states of the region that corruption in all its forms must be 
identified and credibly deterred. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index ranked the countries of the Western Balkans on country rank below 50 among a 
total of 99 countries. The European Commission has established customs assistance 
missions in Albania (CAM-A), Bosnia and Herzegovina (CAFAO), Croatia (CAMES) 
and more recently in Kosovo (CAM-K). As part of these missions, EU customs officers 
work together with their local counterparts to enhance the efficiency of local customs and 
fiscal administrations. Tangible results have been achieved through increased revenue 
collection for the States. 
 Studies show that corruption hits the poor more than any other members of the 
society.129 They are not able to pay additional sums for health care, education, and civil 
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registrations; all the same they are not able to pay bribes for better services.130 Western 
Balkan countries have weaknesses in public sector service functions, including credible 
and consistent regulation and infrastructure necessary for private sector development. 
There has been notable progress in Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. The International 
Community interested in the democratic developments of the region is constantly 
working in Bosnia and Kosova. Serbia and Montenegro is trying to leave behind the 
legacy of the past131.  
 The obstacles to investment include a combination of weak legal and judicial 
institutions, providing not the necessary confidence that contracts will be enforced.  
 The financial sector, which is central to a market economy by enabling payments, 
savings and investments, is still weak throughout the region. Based on EBRD Transition 
Indicators, the regulation of financial institutions in the region received an average score 
lower than the countries of Eastern Europe but much higher than the Commonwealth of 
the Independent States.  
 Despite substantial difference between the countries of the region, administrative 
capacity is still weak. The Council of Europe is providing training grants but, in general, 
the public administration is not well trained, and it lacks the necessary equipment. In 
addition, another concern is emerging, i.e.: enrollment on ethnic bases (very noted in 
Macedonia, in some sectors it is 94% to 6%). It undermines the coexistence and generates 
tensions. 
 Public institutions can only function with a strong civil service and functioning 
public administration. Civil servants need motivation for adequate performance, which 
requires the establishment of merit-based bureaucratic career paths. Many of the civil 
services in the region lack a structured civil service, established and managed according 
to merit principles and evaluated according to education and results. In many countries it 
is still subject to political parties, which, once in power, purge the administration and 
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enroll their own political supporters. The national security institutions suffer more from 
this destructive phenomenon. There are very good efforts to be noted in Croatia, and 
Albania. Macedonia is a case, which should get out of the present situation as soon as 
possible. 
 Destabilizing forms of extreme nationalism have been marginalized in the current 
governments of each country. Generally, the arrival of moderate governments provided 
the necessary confidence to move forward the process of drawing each country closer to 
the EU. The political elections of 5 October 2002 in BiH brought the nationalists in 
power again because the moderates lost the confidence of their voters.  Over time the 
attractions of extreme nationalism should diminish as its political outlook is shown to be 
increasingly out of touch with the demands of modernization and reform and integration 
with the EU.  
 One of the most promising fact that the Western Balkans is committed to 
cooperate and hopefully to leave behind the past is the increased frequency and substance 
of the bilateral and multilateral contacts for different issues and problems of national and 
regional importance, such as border management, the fight against corruption, dual 
citizenship, refugee returns, pension and social security rights, economic cooperation etc. 
The most significant development has been the efforts of the Albanian government and 
the Serbian one to reestablish normal relations and contacts after ten years. Nevertheless, 
the partial integration would dramatically improve the situation and will help to fulfill 
very soon all the conditions of the pre-accession process. Otherwise it will take decades 
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V. THE WESTERN BALKANS: A RESPONSIBILITY AND PERMANENT 
               CONCERN OF EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
No words men write can stop the war 
Or measure up to the relief 
Of its immeasurable grief …. 
May an Accord be reached, and may 
This aide-mémoire on what they say, 
Be the dispatch that I intend; 
Although addressed to a Whitehall, 
Be under Flying Seal to all 
Who wish to read it anywhere, 
And, if they open it, En Clair. 
 
W. H. Auden, New Year Letter 
  
A. THE DAY AFTER  
 The maxim of Cicero: ‘Cedant arma togae’ does not always apply in societies that 
enjoy the rule of law. Yet, on the other hand, it may apply in societies which give the 
foremost place to military values, even though civil and military power are concentrated 
in the same hands, as in the case of European monarchs before 1789. In fact, arms did not 
yield to the toga until quite a late stage in human history. This late stage seems to be still 
remote for some parts of the Western Balkans, because those feelings of the past, which 
really generated the ten-year bloody war, are still very present, especially in Serbia, the 
largest state of the Western Balkans.  
While Albania is proceeding to strengthen the rule of law and order within the 
country, Croatia continues to make impressive progress in distancing itself from its 
nationalist past.  
 Bosnia is still under the legacy of war and the contradictions of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement132. Any policy that tends to prevent the country from meeting its international 
commitments or that promotes another partition of the state could be disastrous--risking 
undoing all that has been accomplished to date and potentially triggering a new conflict.  
 The bloody violence triggered in Macedonia during 2001 made clear the need not 
only to contain conflict in the short-term but also to pay special attention to and work 
                                                          
132 Debate on Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management (includes EC aid to Southeast Europe), p. 4-10, 
Strasbourg, 14 March 2000. 
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hard on the implementation of political decisions, particularly the Ohrid Agreements, so 
as to improve civil rights and relations between the Macedonians and the Albanians, the 
largest entities of the republic133.  
 Kosova is under the jurisdiction of the UN, which, at the end of 2003, will hand 
over its competencies to the local government that emerged from the general elections of 
2001. UN and the local authorities are committed to implementing the reforms so as to 
strengthen the local institutions and the rule of law for a multi-ethnic society. They are 
also working for the return and reintegration of the displaced persons134. 
 The proposal of the president of the Democratic Party of Kosova and former PM  
Hashim Thaçi to temporarily freeze the discussions on the final status is welcomed by the 
US135, but this issue is very important for it has a strong impact on Western Balkans' 
stability and on preventing other nationalist and humanitarian disasters. 
 The final status of Kosova is also important in that it impacts the United States' 
military’s readiness and availability for other missions; and a lasting solution, which 
would allow the United States troops to withdraw, demands the leadership of the United 
States in resolving the final status issues. Declarations expressed in letters like the one the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Nebojsa Covic, sent to the Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary General in Kosova, Michael Steiner, on 4 March 2003136, that hints at 
the partition of Kosova and would mean a failure of all the efforts of the international 
community and the international organizations involved, are very dangerous because they 
generate tensions.  
 The present Serbia presents a picture of the new politicians attempting to 
implement democratic reforms, including cooperation with the Hague, and of the hard-
liners who are opposing the new European stand in favor of nationalist policies (Serbian 
and Croat nationalism has always been closely linked with the Church, and reminders of 
                                                          
133 The fighting in 2001 resulted in more than 200 casualties; more than 100,000 persons were exiled or 
internally displaced, and relations between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanians reached a record low.  
134 Williamson, R. S. (U.S. Representative to the UN for Special Political Affairs): Statement to the UN 
Security Council, New York, 6 February 2003.  
135 http://www.kosova.com/lexo.php?kat=1&artikulli=10043. 
136 Covic, N., Letter sent to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Michael Steiner in 
Kosova, 4 March 2003. 
 
 51   
these historic links on occasion produce bizarre results137.) The post-Milosevic 
government supports extremist elements in both Bosnia and Kosova, and Serbian policies 
toward ethnic minorities are still unacceptable. However, the European Union is less 
critical and not as firm in its stand on Serbia as it was, for instance, toward Croatia. 
Serbia should fulfill the same requirements as other former Yugoslav Republics are 
doing, notably Croatia138. 
 In 2002, Serbia and Montenegro began negotiations to create a looser Federation, 
which was realized on 4 February 2003.  At the same time, both countries agreed that a 
referendum on full independence will be held in three years139. 
 Despite the agreement, which bears the approval of the respective parliaments, the 
republics show no sign of commitment to cooperate at the federal level. They are focused 
on their own institutions and their own problems. There are a lot of Serbian economists 
who believe it would be better for their country to go it alone. 
 The main problem both states face, despite the result of the future referendum, is 
civilian control over the armed forces. On 24 June 2002, former president Kostunica 
dismissed the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, but it didn’t come as a 
natural result of the implementation of democratic reform in the armed forces of 
Yugoslavia or in the context of dismantling the legacy of Milosevic from the armed 
forces. It was a result of the struggle for power going on between him and the 
assassinated Prime Minister Djindjic. There are allegations that Kostunica wanted to use 
the army against Djindjic’s government.  
 Public opinion in Montenegro is divided into two major groups: for and against 
independence. The former socialist party of Montenegro, which sees the future of the 
republic in a federation with Serbia, strongly opposes independence, but it doesn’t seem 
to be able to generate any violence or a counter separatist movement within the country. 
Montenegrin President Gjukanovic’s coalition is for an independent Montenegro. Both 
groups are looking to the future for no one is able to pass the bill in the parliament (it 
requires two-thirds of the seats) right now.  
                                                          
137 Borba, p. 5, 4 November 1971. 
138 World Bank approves US$80 million credit in support of social sector reforms in Serbia, World Bank, 
22 April 2003. 
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 Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Euro-Atlantic institutions have taken 
responsibility for the security of the Western Balkans, and the region has become their 
permanent concern. The military presence continues to assist in BiH, Kosova and 
Macedonia. SFOR140 of 13,000 maintains a peaceful environment, helping BiH realize its 
program of reforms aimed at the European integration. The major contributor is 
NATO141. KFOR, of about 30,000 troops, maintains security and order in Kosova, 
helping implement resolution 1244 of the UNSC142. NATO143 is also the major 
contributor to KFOR.  In Macedonia, on 31 March 2003 an EU force of 300 troops 
replaced the NATO mission, Operation Allied Harmony. However, NATO will still be 
committed in Macedonia through a senior civilian representative and a senior military 
representative in Skopje (According to the US Secretary of State, the EU troops do not 
contradict NATO, but they complement the work of the Alliance144).   
 In spite of aspirations145, the summit of Prague left behind the Western Balkans, 
declaring that “Albania, Macedonia and Croatia are under consideration for future 
membership”146. They did not give up, and they continue to struggle for the membership 
card. On the second of May 2003, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and the US (through its 
Secretary of State) signed the United States-Adriatic partnership Charter (Adriatic 3), 
which will be a working program for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in their efforts for 
full integration into NATO and other European institutions. In that context, the three will 
                                                                                                                                                                             
139 CIA World Factbook, updated on 19 March 2003 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/). 
140 Stabilization Force 
141 NATO nations contributing to SFOR: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. New NATO members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania, 
Latvia. Non NATO Nations: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, and Russia. 
Australia and New Zealand contribute by special arrangement with the United Kingdom. 
142 The resolution 1244 is adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999.  
143 KFOR: NATO Nations: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. New NATO members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia Lithuania, Slovenia, and 
Romania. Non NATO nations: Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates.   
144 Powell, C., Remarks at the U.S.-Adriatic Charter Signing Ceremony, Tirana, Albania, 2 May 2003. 
145 Pickering, Th., A Transatlantic Community for the 21st Century, pp. 124-126, 4 February 2000. 
146 Prague Summit Declaration (issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Prague), paragraph 6, 21 November 2002. 
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work with each other and with their neighbors to build a Western Balkan region that is 
free, democratic, secure, and prosperous147.   
 This short note shows that the Western Balkans, de facto, is part of the North 
Atlantic Alliance Area. None of these states directly involved in the war had the 
membership card, but they have been treated according to Article 5 of the Alliance: 
Serbia attacked them and NATO attacked Serbia. Why not grant them the official 
invitation? It will be a lighter burden, and the situation will improve very soon. Partial 
integration into the EU and NATO membership will defuse tensions in the region, above 
all, Western Balkans nationalism; and security, law and order, and economic 
development will be the effect. Less money will be spent and revenue will be maximized.  
 The assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003 is 
a dark sign not only for Serbia but for the whole region and for Europe, too. Djindjic’s 
assassins mostly came from the former State Security (DB) structures of Serbia and 
counterparts associated with the Yugoslav Army (VJ) Counterintelligence Service (KOS) 
who oppose European values and aspire to a role in politics, government and society148. 
In their efforts they have a strong ally, Serb nationalism. The new status would suffocate 
these dark forces and their legacy of the past.   
B. THE LEGACY OF THE PAST 
Security and stability across the area, however, continue to be a problem owing to 
residual nationalism, weak government institutions, weak economies, and the lack of the 
rule of law and justice. The displaced persons still suffer difficult conditions149.  
 The wars, the turmoil and the opposition to democratic reform on the part of some 
Serbian politicians and Serbian political circles is related to the historic traditions of 
Serbia as the torch-bearer of Slavism. While Yugoslav nations emerged in the nineteenth 
                                                          
147 This agreement provides for trilateral meetings on the level of foreign affairs ministers, defense 
ministers, and ministers of justice as well as on the level of the prime ministers of each of the three 
countries at least twice a year. This also refers to the general managers of the customs administrations and 
the NGO representatives. On the other hand, the United States will do everything possible to assist the 
peoples of Albania, Macedonia and Croatia to fulfill their potential and to complete their journey back to 
NATO and to the heart of Europe. This agreement acknowledges that the three Western Balkans countries 
are on the path to NATO membership, though only at a later stage (Gazeta Shqiptare, 3 May 2003 and 
Powell, C., Remarks at the U.S.-Adriatic Charter Signing Ceremony, Tirana, Albania, 2 May 2003.  
148“Charges over Serb PM Murder,” BBC News World Edition, Tuesday, 29 April 2003. 
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and twentieth centuries, their formation started much earlier. They consider themselves 
heirs to their medieval states, stressing their greatness and the historic continuities150. 
Though ethnic myths often do not correspond to historic reality, they did help keep the 
culture alive during periods of foreign rule, built national identity, and enabled modern 
nations to form within the existing empires. Serbian myths not only contributed to the 
struggle for national independence, but they are still inspiring a large part of the 
population. 
 War, enemy occupation, despoliation by the Hapsburg151 and Ottoman Empires 
and a sense of collective humiliation acted as catalysts in the emergence of national 
identity. As Schulze argues, this kind of historical arrogance was not only meant to 
reinforce internal solidarity and the creation of united Serbian-Croat-Slovene nation, it 
provided evidence for more ambitious claims, as history pointed out later on152.  
The nationalist ideas started out as the will to be liberated from the invader, such 
as in Fichte or Herder’s legacy. But these ideas, as we saw, went beyond all reason.  
 There were two conflicting concepts regarding the future organization of that 
state: the centralized one, which meant a unitary state, dominated by Serbs, and a 
decentralized and federal concept that recognized the existence of ethnic pluralism and 
promoted broad ethnic autonomy and the equality of all South Slavic nations. The 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was founded on the Greater Serbia principle. But clashes 
between centralized and decentralized models continued through the seven decades of the 
existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslav and during the period of its 
dismantling. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
149 Commission of the European Communities, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stabilization and Association 
Report, Brussels, 2002. 
150 These Medieval states are the main origin of their identity even if they were short-lived. Slovenes refer 
to the Medieval state of Carantania/Karantanija in the 8th century (in the territory of present day Austria) 
and Great Panonia in the 9th century (present day Hungary). Croats stress the importance of the Medieval 
Kingdom of Croatia. Bosnian Muslims refer to the Medieval Bosnian state. Serbs consider themselves heirs 
to the Medieval Serbian Empire that was independent from the 11th to the 14th centuries. Montenegrins are 
especially proud of the actual independence of the Montenegrin state that was established in the 18th 
century. Macedonians stress the importance of the independence of a short-lived Samuel’s state at the end 
of the 10th century that was recaptured by the Byzantine Empire in 1018. 
151Friedman, F., The Bosnian Muslims, Denial of a Nation, p.108, Westview Press, 1996. 
152 Schulze, H., States, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 306-336, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, and Wolff, 
L., Inventing Eastern Europe, the Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, pp. 156-162, 
Stanford University Press, 1994.  
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The centralization was reflected in the first constitutional concept of ‘one nation 
of three names, historically divided into three ‘tribes,’ Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This 
concept, based on Serbian expansionist tendencies linking ‘nation’ and ‘people’, denied 
the existence of Macedonians, Montenegrins (The Serbs believe that the Montenegrins 
are Serbs153), and Bosnians as distinct ethnic groups. This Constitution did not protect the 
linguistic rights of numerous ethnic minorities. There was no ethnic or regional 
autonomy, and the intention was to divide ethnic communities into several administrative 
units in order to decrease their internal ethnic coherence154.   
 Increasingly, the non-Serbian citizens became dissatisfied with the denial of the 
existence of ethnic pluralism, with Serbian domination and expansionism, with economic 
and social crises, with the restrictions of human rights and the curtailment of democracy, 
and with centralism and unitarism. The endeavors resulted in the Croatian-Serbian 
Agreement (Cvetkovic-Macek), signed on 23 August 1939. This agreement recognized 
the equality of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the common state as the foundation for 
resolving the nationalism question in Yugoslavia. It is important for it opened the road to 
the process of decentralization and federalization.  
 The communist constitution of January 1946155 followed the rather centralized 
Soviet federal model establishing a "people’s democracy"156.  
 Although formally decentralized, even with the introduction of certain co-federal 
solutions, former Yugoslavia was more centralized than anticipated by the constitutional 
system. President Tito and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) were the 
main integrative factors. Their functioning was mostly informal, since the constitution 
did not determine their role.  
                                                          
153 NIN, p. 18, 28 June 1970; NIN, p. 32, 19 April 1970. 
154 Schulze, H., States, Nations and Nationalism, p. 157, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, and Wolff, L.,  
Inventing Eastern Europe, the Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment pp. 304-14, Stanford 
University Press, 1994.  
155“Zakon o Ustavotvorni Skupscini - The Law on the Constituent Assembly,” Sluzbeni list DFJ/ Uradni 
list DFJ - Official Gazette of the DFY, No. 63, 1945. 
156 The Constituent Assembly was composed of the Federal Chamber, a house of representatives where one 
representative was elected per 40,000 voters, and the Chamber of Nations representing the ethnic plurality 
of the Yugoslav community. Each of the six federal units, irrespective of its size, elected 25 
representatives, whereas citizens of Vojvodina elected 15, and citizens of Kosova and Metohija, 10 
representatives to the Chamber of Nations. Such a regulation was to ensure equality of nations and 
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 The ethnic crisis was deepening day by day during 70s, but it became more and 
more obvious during the 1980s. The ruling regime, for a long time, did not acknowledge 
or deal with the crisis. It was not until the end of the 1980s that a decision was made to 
amend the federal constitution. Although the changes were urgent, there was no 
consensus on how to do so, for the constitution could only be amended by the consensus 
of all federal units. Finally, a compromise solution was adopted that did not solve the 
problems. The Amendments of 1988 introduced a wider democratization and the 
necessary economic and political reforms proposed by the federal government of Prime 
Minister Markovic, but they soon failed because of the lack of political consensus. 
 Subsequent attempts in 1989-1991 to amend the federal constitution and reform 
the political system all failed for lack of consensus. Conflicts between the two different 
political options were constantly growing until they finally paralyzed the existing 
political system. Differences among Socialist Republics and Socialist Autonomous 
Provinces became especially evident in the different level of democratization in every 
federal unit. As noted in the first chapter, Milosevic’s rise to power marked a return to a 
tougher policy. In his speech delivered to one million people at the central celebration 
marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosova, held at Gazimestan, he said:  
… the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own 
benefit either… This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and 
here we are now at the field of Kosova to say that this is no longer the 
case157.  
 This speech was his oath to Serbian nationalism. Right after that date he revoked 
the autonomy of Kosova158 and ignited the disintegration of Yugoslavia while 
unsuccessful attempts to reform the federation were still going on. The official 
recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia by the EU in January 1992 for-
                                                                                                                                                                             
nationalities or federal units, respectively, of Yugoslavia in the drafting and adopting of the new 
constitution.  
157 Milosevich, S., Speech delivered at the central celebration marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle 
of Kosova, held at Gazimestan, 28 June 1989. (Compiled by the National Technical Information Service of 
the Department of Commerce of the U.S.) 
158Ramet, S, Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 
Eastern Europe, p.148, Lanham and Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. 
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mally marked the end of the existence of the Yugoslav state created after World War I159 
and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia created after the WWII.  
There is a very interesting fact to be noticed that the outburst of the first Croat 
anger emerged as economic and social grievances, and as with most nationalist 
movements, it was the middle-class intellectuals and the students who were the front-
runners. When the students took to the streets in November 1971, their protests were at 
first limited to the economic problems of Croatia160, claiming that the federal government 
was draining away Croatia’s national income161. Nationalist-minded writers made great 
play with these figures, stirring deep-rooted anxieties about the survival of the nation162. 
It was implied that Croatia’s best young men were being forced to leave their motherland 
because there was no economic future for them at home. If Croatia were not being bled 
by Belgrade for the benefit of the Serbs, the Macedonians and the Albanians163, she might 
be able to provide for her own sons164. 
On the other hand, assertion of Serbian nationalism is often accompanied by anti-
Croat feelings. After the troubles in Croatia in 1971, there was a wave of hostility 
                                                          
159 Five independent successor states were established in the territory of the former Yugoslav federation: 
the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, and the (Former Yugoslav) Republic of 
Macedonia. 
160 With 22 % of the population, Croatia provided 28.5 % of Yugoslavia's exports in 1970. Slovenia, with 
8.9 % of the population, contributed 17.8 % of the exports, and Serbia, with 42 % of the population, had a 
36.7 % share of the exports [Ekonomska Politika (2 November 1970), p. 15]. Between 1967 and 1970, 
Croatia's share of the total number of foreign tourists entering Yugoslavia rose from 55 to 60 % (Statistifki 
Godisnjak). According to the 1971 census, Croatia, with 20 % of the Yugoslav population, contributed 33% 
of the workers abroad. 5.2 % of the total population of Croatia was employed abroad--the highest 
percentage of any European country except Portugal [“Lica na Privremom Radu u Inostranstvu”, Statistitki 
Bilten, 679, p. 9, 1971]. 
161 Kritika, 17, 1970 and Kritika, 13, 1970. 
162 An article in VUS refers to the biological impoverishment of Croatia because the rate of emigration is 
higher than the rate of natural increase. Croatia's share of the Yugoslav population fell from 23.1 % in 1953 
to 21.5 % in 1971 (The author states that it fell to 19 % in 1968, but the 1971 census records an apparent 
increase since 1968, to 21.5 %) [VUS, pp. 20-3, 18 February 1970]. 
163 It means the Kosovar Albanians. 
164 The significant political fact is that most Croats believe that they have been exploited, and during the 
last ten years enough statistical evidence has been selected to provide convincing evidence to support their 
arguments. The Croats were fully aware of the economic disadvantages to them of belonging to 
Yugoslavia, including the amount of foreign currency earned by Croatian enterprises, the taxes paid to the 
federation, etc. What was not discussed by the federalists were the compensating advantages which Croatia 
derived from her association with Yugoslavia: hundreds of millions of dollars a year from foreign tourists 
depended partly on the federation's investment of large sums in highways, hotels and transport facilities in 
the late fifties and early sixties. There has also been heavy federal support for the shipbuilding industry, 90 
per cent of which was based in Croatia [VUS, pp. 10-11, 4 March 1970 and Vjesnik, p. 7, 8 May 1971]. 
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towards Croatia amongst Serbs in Belgrade. The president of the Union of Belgrade 
Youth warned that it was wrong to assume that youth is immune from nationalism and 
that, in a multinational city like Belgrade, it was particularly important not to encourage 
anti-Croatian feeling among young people165.  
 What went wrong? The different Yugoslav constitutions did not provide adequate 
mechanisms for the democratic management of ethnic relations, and the politicians 
underestimated the importance of a state’s ethnic policy. They feared ethnic diversity as a 
possible source of conflict that could destroy the state. Some provisions in all 
constitutions were never realized or applied and caused serious problem because the 
existing normative system could no longer regulate social processes.  
 In former Yugoslavia informal channels traditionally played a crucial role. The 
important decisions were actually made by President Tito and the LCY and then formally 
confirmed. 
 The centralization option versus the decentralization option continuously 
generated conflicts. In the 1980s the tension between these two options increased again. 
The two conflicting concepts proved to be incompatible. One called for a strong, 
centralized and monolithic federation, without political pluralism166, and the other for 
decentralization, increased autonomy of federal units, the introduction of political 
pluralism and a market economy, and democratic reform of the political system167.  
 Former Yugoslavia represented no democratic political traditions, and most 
politicians were politically socialized in a totalitarian system within a former ruling party. 
In such conditions political leaders and parties desperately searched a way to successfully 
                                                          
165 Borba, 11 December 1971. 
166 The Presidency of the SFRY prepared a proposal for the reform based mostly on the Serbian concept of 
centralized federation. This proposal supported by federal institutions, including the federal army, was 
advocated also by Serbia. "A Concept for the Constitutional System of Yugoslavia on a Federal Basis”, 
Review of Intentional Affairs, v. XLI, No. 974, pp. 15-18, Belgrade, 5 November 1990.  
167 Advocates of decentralization first proposed the transformation of the existing Yugoslav federation into 
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and systems, which already existed in different republics, within one federation. When this proposal was 
refused, a proposal for a Confederate Model among the South Slavic States was made by Slovenia and 
Croatia, but the advocates of centralistic solutions also immediately refused it. "A Confederate Model 
Among the South Slavic States”, Review of Intentional Affairs, v. XLI, No. 973, pp. 11-22, Belgrade. 
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mobilizing people politically. Ethnic identity and especially nationalism proved to be 
most effective in this context168. 
 The case of the former Yugoslavia shows how a relatively successful multiethnic 
state can turn into a disaster in a short time. It shows the importance of the adequate 
regulation of ethnic relations in multiethnic environments. EU integration and the “acquis 
communitaire” would defuse the tensions and would enhance good ethnic relations in a 
plural environment preventing the bloody massacres which evoked the thirsty Gods of the 
French Revolution in the late twentieth century. The sooner the better. 
C.  ISLAM IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 The 11 September 2001 terrorist assault against the United States of America had 
a strong impact on the democratic forces of the region, and the religious situation in the 
Western Balkans became a concern (the Muslim population of the Western Balkans is 
about 6.32 million, most of them Albanians, 4.45 million169).  
 Several questions torment every democrat in the region. Can Islam be a force in 
the Western Balkans or in any country of the region? Can Islam generate a political 
movement in the area that would have a strong impact on European security and beyond? 
Can Islam create informal networks in the post communist countries of the region? Can 
the “Saudi NGO’s” that entered the area under the humanitarian cover of the early 
nineties be successful in their mission? Are the Western Balkans youth educated in 
Islamic countries in the late nineties able to indoctrinate the ordinary citizen filling the 
half-century gap? Is the revival of Islam able to alter the outlook of the Albanians, which 
is mainly based on the Albanian traditional culture and their Christian origins as an 
inherited identity? 
 In the following subchapters we will try to introduce what Islam is and what it 
means in BiH and Albania. We think that Albania has a particular importance because the 
Albanians, wherever they live, consider Albania their mother country. It has nothing to 
do with nationalist feelings for a Greater Albania. No one in Albania would like a greater 
                                                          
168 Ethnic conflicts are conflicts of interests between distinct ethnic communities and/or their members. 
Donald L. H., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 4-16, 95-96, 139-140, 216-228, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1985. 
169 CIA Factbook, 2002. 
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country. The Albanians would like to have the country they have, but integrated into the 
family of the European nations. 
 1.  Islam in Former Yugoslavia 
  a.  General Picture 
  As noticed in the first chapter, there were three main religions in former 
Yugoslavia: Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Islam. The Muslims of former 
Yugoslavia included the Muslim Slavs, who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the 
Albanians, who live in their lands in Kosova, the enclave of Novi Pazar in Serbia, in 
Macedonia and Montenegro; and Turks inhabiting the same regions as the Albanians. 
 The postwar Yugoslav communist government was against religion because of its 
connection with nationality and, thus,  posed a special threat to Yugoslav unity and to 
Yugoslavism170. Although postwar constitutions provided for separation of church and 
state and guaranteed freedom of religion, church-state relations in the postwar period 
were often tense when the government attempted to reduce church influence171.  
 From 1945 to the early 1950s, the authorities carried out antireligious campaigns 
that imprisoned, tortured, and killed many members of the clergy. The government 
subsequently established a general policy of rapprochement, but until the 1980s the state 
still exerted pressure on many religious communities. Yugoslavs who openly practiced a 
religious faith often were limited to low-paying, low-status jobs.  
 After Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslav government no longer pursued a 
consistent policy toward religion, and each republic and province followed policies 
toward religion that were acceptable at home but sometimes unacceptable in other parts 
of the country.  
 In the 1980s Yugoslavia’s Islamic community included about 3,000 religious 
leaders, some of them educated abroad, and 3,000 mosques (Libya and Saudi Arabia 
funded the construction of 800 of them). The only Islamic school of theology of 
                                                          
170 Singleton, F., Twentieth Century Yugoslavia, p. 237, Columbia University Press, 1976.  
171 Friedman, F., The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation, p. 147, Westview Press, 1996. 
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Yugoslavia was in Sarajevo. Some secondary schools were open in Sarajevo, Skopje, and 
Prishtina, as well172.  
 b.  The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Most of the Muslims of Bosnia are Slavs who converted to Islam during 
the stages of Ottoman occupation to gain the higher social status that Ottoman policy 
afforded to converts173. In modern Yugoslavia they were the largest community in 
Bosnia, and, according to the 1991 census, the population of BiH was: Muslims – 
1,905,829, Serbs – 1,369,258, Croats – 755,892, and Yugoslavs174 -- 239,845 out of a 
total of 4,364,574175.  
Right after WWII, the Muslims of Bosnia were considered a unique but a national 
group within Yugoslavia. They were permitted to declare themselves as Serb-Muslims, 
Croat-Muslims, or nationally “undetermined” Muslims. Thus, they were identified 
nationally as either Serbs or Croats but did not possess their own separate national 
identity176. The community as a whole, which was not recognized as a corporate national 
group in the census or through any other mechanism, was denied access to the republic 
and federal levers of power that other national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 
Croats and especially the Serbs) enjoyed. 
 Tito’s prestige in the nonaligned movement increased his importance in world 
affairs. Nonalignment177, in general, and Yugoslavia’s involvement with Middle East 
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elites, in particular, gave Yugoslavia a high profile in international politics. Alongside 
this, Tito’s interest in the fortunes of the Bosnian Muslim community increased, since a 
large contingent of the nonaligned countries was Muslim178. In the 1960s and 1970s, Tito 
used Yugoslavia’s Islamic community to maintain friendly relations with oil-producing 
Arab countries because Yugoslavia needed access to inexpensive oil (After the 1979 
fundamentalist revolution in Iran, the Yugoslav government reviewed its policy on 
potentially destabilizing contacts between Yugoslav Muslims and Middle Eastern 
governments. The mullah responded by disavowing all connection with the pan-Islamic 
movement). This policy was reflected in official recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as 
an integral secular group in Yugoslavia. In the 1961 census the Yugoslav government 
added the category "Muslim (ethnic membership)" and the national identification of the 
Bosnian Muslims became a popular issue in the mid 1960s179.   
 The Muslim designation in the 1971 census as Muslims in the sense of 
nationality, still waffled, causing a large number of Muslims to remain in the Yugoslav 
category180. Nevertheless, more than 1.7 million people throughout Yugoslavia chose the 
Muslim category. According to the census, the Bosnian Muslims were the third largest 
national group in the country and constituted the largest nation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina181. Bosnian Muslim demographics became vitally important as the new 
constitution was promulgated in 1974182.  
 The reforms strengthened the republics to the detriment of the central government 
just as the Bosnian Muslims were in the process of finally being recognized as a separate 
Yugoslav nation with all the privileges that were attached to that designation. Thus, the 
Bosnian Muslims became "more equal" than the other South Slav nations and more 
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privileged than ever before. For the first time in post-1878 history they became influential 
within Yugoslavia. 
 When Tito and Titoism passed away, the political cover that protected Bosnian 
Muslims from the Serbs and the Croats passed away as well. . Their vulnerability 
increased because their needs had to be met and recognition meant that the Serbs and the 
Croats could no longer treat them as subordinates. In the early 80’s the Yugoslav system 
still suffered from party interference, apathy, inefficiency, lack of initiative, and 
corruption183, all of which were compounded by Yugoslavia’s deteriorating economic 
situation. Although the standard of living generally rose, the differential in incomes 
between the more-developed and the less-developed republics also increased184. At this 
time political and economic exigencies became intermixed and heightened the 
nationalistic feelings of those who felt economically deprived and those who felt 
economically robbed. On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims were caught without 
shelter in the crossfire between Croatia’s desire to be free of Serbian hegemony and 
Serbia’s aspirations to recreate its dominant role in Yugoslavia. Thus, the Bosnian 
Muslims have been involved in a game that has been larger and tougher than their 
capacity to cope. Throughout their history, up to the present, they were safest when they 
were part of a multinational coalition with their position protected by a strong central 
government. Their existence within the Ottoman Empire constituted their golden age, 
because they were considered part of the ruling class (as a matter of fact, they enjoyed as 
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much as the Turks wanted to give them). When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the 
Bosnian Muslims’ influence in the region collapsed, as well.  
 The modern tragedy was of medieval proportions, but the last stage, signed at 
Dayton, put an end to the atrocities and lighted a new hope in the hearts of this people, 
that of European integration. The Bosnian Muslims’ stand relative to European values 
was clearly expressed by a Bosnian Muslim religious leader, Mustafa Ceric: 
The truth is that the Muslims in this country do not understand Islam.... 
They do not practice Islam, they have only their names which are Muslim, 
and that is a tradition. Some of them do not even know they are Muslim. 
And yet, as Muslims in this country, we live in a paradox all the time. On 
the one hand we are European, on the other we don’t know what to do 
about Europe. We cannot at the moment love it, we cannot trust it, we 
cannot hate it, we cannot deny it, for we are part of it. We are in a similar 
position in relation to the Serbs and the Croats, with whom we share this 
country, and who disagree between themselves over everything except for 
one thing: their relationship to the Muslims, and their common need to 
destroy us. We simply do not know what to do, or where to place our 
faith.185 
 American diplomacy and NATO liberated them, and they still protect and help 
them strengthen their institutions with the money the EU is providing. The completion of 
the Road Map compiled by the EU to get BiH closer to the EU is movement in the right 
direction. On the other hand, it means that the Bosnians or the Muslims of Bosnia have 
chosen their way of life186.  
 2. Islam in Albania 
Land of Albania! Let me bend mine eyes 
On thee, thou ragged nurse of savage men! 
………………………………………….. 
 (From Lord Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage) 
 During almost the last fifty years in socialism, the Albanians, quite differently 
from the rest of the Western Balkans, were forbidden to practice their religion or any 
religion. Albania was the first country in the world without churches and mosques, 
without priests and mullahs. In the early nineties, when the democratic revolution 
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succeeded and Albania started its journey to Euro-Atlantic integration, religious practices 
were allowed. Not knowing anything about religion or having any religious affiliation, 
more than eighty percent of the population began to identify themselves, according to 
their family tradition, as Muslims (two thirds), Catholics or Christian Orthodox.  
 In this regard, one of the most natural questions to emerge is how, why and when 
Islam was born in Albania, a European Christian country from the first centuries of the 
Christian era, with Durrës on the Adriatic Coast an important Christian center? However, 
when the Roman Empire was divided into East and West (395), the province of Praevalis 
(Doclea-Scodra) in the north and the rest of Albania, although politically part of the 
Eastern Empire, remained dependent on Rome ecclesiastically. In 732, Leo the Isaurian 
detached these lands from Rome and subordinated them to the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. The situation changed in the following centuries when the two churches 
were drifting apart187. 
 For almost four centuries after the schism, Albania was a battleground between 
East and West, with the boundaries of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Orthodox 
Church reflecting the fortunes of the political powers supporting them. The distribution 
of Catholicism and Orthodoxy in Albania is the heritage of these four centuries of East-
West struggle188. 
 Islam was introduced into Albania with the Turkish invasion toward the end of 
the fifteenth century. The conversion of the people to the faith of the invaders was a very 
slow process. In the north, the propagation of Islam met Roman Catholic opposition. 
Waves of conversions occurred when such Catholic powers as Venice and Austria were 
at war with the Ottoman Empire189.  
 The Orthodox Christians in the south suffered a different fate during the first 
centuries of Turkish domination. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II, in 
order to secure the allegiance of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, proclaimed 
himself the protector of the Orthodox Church, and a decree secured the old rights and 
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privileges for the newly elected Patriarch and his successors. However, Islamic pressure 
was felt when the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century began190.  
 Albanian literature, especially of the ninetieth century, lauded the pre-Turkish 
freedom of the Albanians and their wars against the Ottoman invaders. Later on, one of 
Albania’s most celebrated poets, Frasheri (a Bektashi), sang in all his works of the love 
for the country and of the battles of the Albanians against the Turks191. Authors such as 
Konitza, Skendo, and Cajupi made love for the fatherland their main object. All those 
works prepared the Albanians for their war of independence, which they won on 28 
November 1912.  
 Albania emerged from Turkish domination with about two-thirds of the 
population followers of Islam192. In the period between the two World Wars, independent 
Albania did not adopt a state religion. The constitutions of the Republic and of the 
Kingdom both declared that the Albanian state had no official religion, that all religions 
and faiths were respected, and that their liberty of practice was assured193. Outstanding 
authors such as Fishta, Prennushi, Mjeda, Noli, Poradeci, and Migjeni introduced, in their 
books, the heroic life of the highlanders, the lyric spirit of the common Albanian, and the 
difficult economic situation under King Zog194. 
 As soon as the Communist Party took over (on 28 November 1944), it brought all 
religious bodies under the complete control of the government. The communists began to 
characterize dissenting clergymen as class enemies and to view the religious 
establishment as an antagonistic contradiction within Albanian society. Accordingly, they 
took steps to combat and at least neutralize the threat that, in their view, religion and 
religious bodies presented to their power and authority as well as to their program for 
building a socialist society. Their larger design, in strict accord with their Marxist-
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Leninist outlook, was to eliminate religion as a feature of Albanian life195. To dethrone 
God and replace him with the trinity of materialism, science, and reason, the advocates of 
atheism relied not only on communist doctrine but on such disciplines as history, science, 
cultural anthropology, biology, medicine, and philosophy.  
 The Hoxha leadership196 maintained that religion is alien to the Albanian people, 
since all three faiths in contemporary Albanian society were brought into the country by 
alien powers. In Hoxha’s view197, since religion was used by enemies of the Albanian 
nation against the national interests of the Albanian people, enlightened leaders of the 
country could not be expected to have much sympathy for it. The result was that the 
nationalist movement assumed a nonreligious character, and, in fact, prompted leaders of 
the Albanian national movement to discourage religion in order to encourage nationalism. 
A celebrated slogan of the time was: "The religion of the Albanian people is 
Albanianism." Thus, the poet Pashko Vasë Shkodrani (1825-1892), addressing himself to 
the Albanian people, wrote: 
Christian and Muslim priests have benumbed you, 
To divide you, and impoverish you! 
Look not to churches and to mosques, 
For the religion of the Albanian is Albanianism!  
 Albanian nationalism thus provided the Albanian communist regime with a 
powerful base from which to mount an attack on the various religious bodies in the 
country198. Religion was seen not only as an accomplice, so to speak, of a pervasive 
social evil but as the ideological basis for the evil. A major aspect of this evil was the 
inferior and restricted position of women in Albanian society, for which religion was 
severely blamed. 
 After the 5th Congress of the Communist Party and Hoxha’s speech of February 
6, 1967, the struggle between communist atheism and religion assumed the character of a 
major movement with a profound ideological content. The youth and other masses of the 
people in villages and cities demanded that the mosques and churches, temples and 
                                                          
195 Dokumenta kryesore te P.P.SH. I [Main documents of APL], v.1, p. 357, Tirane: Instituti i Historise se 
Partise prane K.Q. te P.P.SH., 1960.  
196 Enver Hoxha was the First Secretary of the Albanian Communist Party, PLA, from 1941-1985.  
197 Hoxha, E., Report on the Role and Tasks of the Democratic Front for the Complete Triumph of 
Socialism in Albania, p. 65. Naim Frasheri Publishing House, Tirane, 1967. 
 68   
monasteries, all the “holy places,” be closed down; that the clergy give up their parasitic 
life and become working people living like everyone else.  
 With the destruction of religious centers, the important bases, which “poisoned 
human minds and served as hotbeds for hostile activity,” were wiped out. Thus, Albania 
became the first country in the world without churches and mosques, without priests and 
hodjas199. 
 The new Constitution officially banished religion from the Albanian state200. 
Hoxha’s successor, Ramiz Alia, adopted a relatively tolerant stance toward 
religious practice, referring to it as "a personal and family matter.’’ Émigré clergymen 
were permitted to reenter the country in 1988 and officiate at religious services. Mother 
Teresa visited Tiranë for the first time in 1989, where she was received with great love by 
every Albanian. She was received by the representatives of the last communist 
government, as well, such as the foreign minister and Hoxha’s widow. In December 
1990, the ban on religious observance was officially lifted in time to allow thousands of 
Christians to attend Christmas services201. 
 Religious leaders estimate that 95 percent of all mosques and churches had been 
razed or gutted during the years of communist rule. A few had been spared and 
designated as "cultural monuments." Others were converted to sports arenas. The status 
of the clergy was equally appalling. There were no Muslim clerics, as Albanian schools 
remained secular. Nevertheless, in 1992 plans were under way to restore the houses of 
worship, and seminaries were being reopened to teach young Albanians who knew 
virtually nothing about their religion. Some properties have been returned and the 
government has declared its willingness to return mosques and churches to their owners, 
but progress has been slow. At this time, some mosques from the Ottoman period were 
renovated by Turkish aid. Saudi Arabia finances the construction of new ones.   
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 During the first years of the transition period (early nineties), when the country 
faced immense economic difficulties, and the government, for economic purposes, 
entered Albania into the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), some Islamic 
NGO’s, mostly from Saudi Arabia, were able to penetrate Albania trying to start their 
activity under the humanitarian cover. The Albanian membership in the OIC probably 
encouraged those NGO’s, which, as a matter of fact, not only became very active in 
religious affairs, but opened also an Islamic Bank in Tirana202.  
 Young students were sent to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan 
to study Islamic theology. Most of them could not endure the life and customs of these 
schools and turned back. Others succeeded, and today, they serve in different parts of the 
country as clergy. People say that they behave differently. They tend to be violent and 
refuse to discuss their views and their new stand, which are against the Albanian 
traditional customs. Some of them have money and they are able to build new mosques 
when the traditionalists oppose them as it happened in Dragostunjë203.  
 On the other hand, a struggle for power between the young mullahs, educated 
from Islamic Universities, and the old generation is noticed in the Muslim Hierarchy204.  
 Beginning in November 1995 some Islamic high schools were opened in Albania 
including “Liria” in Elbasan, “Hoxha” in Gjirokastër, “Hafiz Ali Korça“ in Kavajë, 
“Haxhi Sheh Shamia in Shkodër” and “Haxhi Hafiz Mehmet“ in Tiranë. In December of 
1999 “Vexhi Buharaj” was opened in Berat and “Mustafa” in Durrës. Several hundred 
students from very modest families attend these schools.  
In the wake of September 11, Albania continues to be an active partner in the 
fight against international terrorism, pledging "any and all assistance" to US efforts. 
Government and political leaders quickly condemned the attacks. The Government also 
pledged NATO access to air and seaports for units participating in Operation Enduring 
Freedom, and Albania was almost the only country from the Western Balkans to support 
the war against terror in Iraq and sent its troops in both operations. In addition, the 
parliamentary Assembly called upon all banks in Albania to locate the accounts of 
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individuals suspected of possessing terrorist ties and to prevent fund withdrawal or 
transfer. The Albanian courts already have frozen the assets of one suspected al-Qaida 
supporter, and the Ministry of Finance is working to strengthen its anti-money laundering 
legislation. 
The Albanian Government simultaneously raided the Tirana headquarters of four 
Islamic-based NGOs believed to be involved in international Islamic extremism, detained 
and interrogated their principal officers, then deported them, together with their families, 
into the custody of police authorities from their home countries. From late October 
through December 2001, Albanian authorities conducted three additional raids: two on 
Islamic based NGOs suspected of supporting extremist activity, and the third on the 
Tirana headquarters of an Albanian business owned by a suspected al-Qaida supporter 
watch listed by the US Department of the Treasury. The Albanian government detained 
and interrogated those organizations’ principal officers.  
 Albania continues to cooperate closely with US counterterrorism efforts on a 
number of levels and quite recently with the Britons. However, grossly insufficient 
border security, corruption, organized crime, and institutional weaknesses combine to 
make Albanian territory an attractive target for exploitation by terrorist and Islamic 
extremist groups205. 
 In their approach to the future the Albanians look to Europe, the United States and 
the West in general206. Very significant is the fact that during the difficult years of 
transition no Albanian from the almost one million who left the country went to the 
Islamic countries.  They went to Western Europe, the United States and Canada. This 
outlook of the Albanians is mainly based on the Albanian traditional culture207. It is not 
by chance that Mother Teresa is an Albanian. The beauty of her spirit reflects the deep 
Albanian compassion and altruism known through history. When she took the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1979, she said:  
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I choose the poverty of our poor people. But I am grateful to receive (the 
Nobel) in the name of the hungry, the naked, the homeless, of the crippled, 
of the blind, of the lepers, of all those people who feel unwanted, unloved, 
uncared-for throughout society, people that have become a burden to the 
society and are shunned by everyone.  
 More than one hundred years ago the most celebrated Albanian poet, Frasheri, 
said, “For the Albanians the sun rises in the West.” It rises in the West because of the 
deep Albanian roots, because Albania and the Albanians are part of the West and belong 
to the West. The sooner the West acts the better for every one. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 After the sudden and dramatic collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 
the notions of a ‘return to Europe’ and a ‘common European house’ emerged as powerful 
concepts, particularly in the Western Balkans. But, as in the fairytales, the Western 
Balkans had to walk through Purgatory on its road to Europe. A bloody war dragged on 
for ten years involving Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes and Albanians. It is currently 
contained, but hundred of thousands of people in the region lost their lives. Women and 
children were killed, violated and displaced by terror and genocide; their homes were 
destroyed. It is not easy amidst this suspicion, hatred, discontent and extremism to iron 
things out.   
 In spite of all this, today the peoples and governments of the Western Balkans are 
committed to leaving the past behind. One of the most promising facts is the increased 
frequency and substance of the bilateral and multilateral contacts of the Western Balkans 
states regarding various issues and problems of national and regional importance, such as 
border management, the fight against corruption, dual citizenship, the return of refugees, 
pension and social security rights, economic cooperation etc. The most significant 
development has been the efforts of the Albanian and Serbian governments to reestablish 
normal relations and contacts after ten years. 
 Present European policy aims at making the Balkans prosperous so as to bring to 
Europe not only the Balkans' marvelous nature and resources, but also its human and 
cultural energy. It aims at getting rid of the old animosities of the region, defusing the 
tensions, and restoring law and order throughout its southern borders through the 
integration process for the Southeastern Europe (i.e., the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, the Stabilization and Association Process, and the CARDS program).  
The Stabilization and Association process is a long-term policy aimed at 
establishing the rule of law, democratic and stable institutions, and a free market 
economy in all the states of the Western Balkans, paving their road to the EU. But the 
principle of conditionality, clearly expressed in the Stabilization and Association process, 
clashes with the principle of regionality of other European initiatives for the Western 
Balkans (such as the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe). The integration process, 
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which excludes parts of the region (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia), may deepen the 
differences, and, in this context, may endanger regional stability. All the same, it may 
enhance parasite economies based on crime, clientelism and corruption, rather than on 
economic reform.  
 On the other hand, the policies of the Stability Pact as long-term structural 
projects are threatened by the anxiety and expectations of the region to produce 
sustainable and reliable results in the short term. So, conditionality creates differences 
and tensions that regionality cannot overcome.   
 Furthermore, the regionality principle and EU enlargement are dividing the 
Balkans into two different parts.  Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria are candidate countries 
seeking EU membership in the next round of enlargement (Slovenia will join the EU in 
2004, Romania and Bulgaria in 2007). The EU will thus separate the region, while 
simultaneously promoting multilateral cooperation among its states. Thus, regional 
cooperation as a pre-accession condition may slow the progress of democratic reforms 
and the rule of law, creating new tensions in the Western Balkans.  
 The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe faces tension even between Balkans 
difficulties and European preferences. To restore lost confidence in the Stability Pact 
Office, western democracies may reconsider the priorities of the region and offer more 
suitable ones to the international donor community. 
  On the other hand, the Pact is not entirely an EU responsibility. The European 
Union manages only the Regional Table. In this context, the realization of the Stability 
Pact will require the European Union to take full responsibility for its implementation. 
 The World Bank, appropriately, leads Working Table Two. NATO, for political 
purposes, is not the leading organization for Working Table Three, in spite of the large 
presence of the North Atlantic Alliance throughout the western part of the Peninsula.  
The fact that the two initiatives, the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and 
Association Process, have the same object, i.e. the development of the Western Balkans 
and bringing the states of the region closer to Europe, presents an important problem--
how to harmonize these two policies. This concern links permanently the process of 
regional security and stability in the Western Balkans to the process of European 
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enlargement. However, the EU took the necessary precautions to connect the European 
perspective for the Western Balkans with the Copenhagen Criteria. Conditionality 
became the main principle for the “pre-pre-accession” of the Western Balkans.  
 However, there is not any clear connection between the Stability Pact and the 
Stabilization process, despite the fact that the instruments of the Stability Pact contains 
the expression “The Stability Pact is complementary to the Stabilization and Association 
Process and the accession process.” Nevertheless, negotiations for the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements will be opened bilaterally. By this logic, reform assistance and 
closer relations will be granted to countries that have already managed to fulfill the basic 
criteria, while the countries which are behind in the reform process or which exhibit 
“Stabilization deficits” will not qualify for the conditional EU offers.  
 The Stabilization or pre-accession process creates new difficulties among the 
countries of the region. It deepens the gap between the advanced and the less advanced, 
the stabilized and the “problematic” countries, increasing the frontiers between the poor 
and the rich, the secure and the insecure countries, thus undermining regional cooperation 
and accentuating the Balkans differences. This may generate new tensions in the region.  
 The present accession procedure is long, complicated and drawn out with ample 
scope for difficulties to arise and for individual member states and EU institutions to 
delay or even sabotage the process. 
 Considering the region’s unequal capabilities, the financial burden of 
reconstruction and stabilization, as well as the potentially counter-productive effects of 
EU initiatives for the region, the problems of the Western Balkans can be better solved by 
including all countries of the region in the same process of European enlargement. This 
policy is based on the economic strength of the EU and the very small economic 
proportions of the Western Balkans. 
 This idea gives priority to the economic rather than to political or civil-society 
incentives and gives preference to European solutions over bilateral support for reform 
efforts or intra-regional cooperation.  
 The partial integration would dramatically improve the situation and would help 
to fulfill very soon all the conditions of the pre-accession process. Otherwise, it will take 
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decades for the Western Balkans to meet the requirements posed by the present European 
initiatives. 
 Partial membership would introduce a model of enlargement “light” for the 
Western Balkans, assuming the EU accepted compromises in the adoption of the acquis, 
and if the countries of the region gave up some of the principal rights of full membership.  
On the other hand, European accession does not provide any instant solution to all 
Western Balkans problems and, in particular, does not, in itself, guarantee economic 
success. But it will offer a chance to attract the foreign investments and EU financial aid 
desperately needed for economic development and enhanced growth. Thus, the whole 
region could move quite soon to free trade and a customs union, to a currency dependent 
on the EURO, and, thereafter, to the EURO itself. 
 Partial integration would prevent the Western Balkans economy from depending 
on state subventions or international assistance. It would prevent the weak governments 
of the region from abandoning or slowing down the program of reforms. Partial 
integration would have a strong positive impact on the intra-regional trade and bilateral 
relations with the EU because the borders would be open for free movement for people 
and goods. 
Furthermore, partial integration would help individual Western Balkans countries 
prepare for European integration. It could group other initiatives and forms of 
cooperation around the Stabilization and Association Agreements and would contribute 
to the realization of the Stability Pact. It would extend the European Economic Area, 
trade facilitation, and free trade agreements (similar to those of the member or candidate 
states), and introduce the EURO throughout the Western Balkans.   
Some of the above elements, especially those concerning trade, could be 
implemented throughout the region, thereby enhancing regional cooperation between EU 
candidate states (Slovenia, Rumania, and Bulgaria) and the Western Balkans. Thus, this 
different integrating policy would not diminish the conditionality of the EU pre-accession 
process.  
As noted above, the policy of ‘partial integration’ or ‘observer status’ is not 
against the previous initiatives. Rather, it reorganizes the Stability Pact, the Stabilization 
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and Association Process, the CARDS-program, the Europe-Agreements and Accession 
Partnerships, creating a new framework with a clear picture of the conditions and steps of 
each phase. From this perspective, this integration policy for the Western Balkans 
involves the EU as a whole in dealing with other concerned organizations. 
This strategy brings together the policies of the Stability Pact, which are aimed at 
regional cooperation, and the Stabilization and Association process, which is oriented 
towards conditionality and bilateral negotiations. It focuses on concrete options and 
specific policy areas. The coordination of both initiatives may outline a functional 
cooperation program for the EU institutions, other organizations, and the governments of 
the Western Balkans. 
This different model would speed the integration process in the Western Balkans, 
creating real prospects for both political and economic success. At the same time, this 
policy would make manageable the expectations and the apprehensions that have 
emerged in different Balkans states. It could serve as a cure for the two main problems of 
the Western Balkans: poverty due to unemployment and weak economies, and 
criminality. But the Union, before taking this course, should modify the Copenhagen 
Criteria.   
The partial membership of the Western Balkans wouldn’t cause serious problems 
vis-à-vis the old policy concern of ‘widening versus deepening’, which goes back at least 
as far as the first EU summit at the Hague in 1969. The partial membership cannot create 
any potential conflict in the practical effects of the EU’s institutions. It may not impose 
strains on particular aspects of EU policy because all the countries of the Western 
Balkans will have an observer status.  
 In this way, a partial integration of the Western Balkans would not have any 
impact on the decision-making and the working relations of the EU member states. 
However, it could raise a lot of objections because it would change totally the principle of 
enlargement and would disregard the conditionality posed for the Luxembourg Six and 
the Helsinki Six. It might slow down the processes of European enlargement and might 
generate strong opposition from the ten newcomers. It might raise problems within the 
EU-15, and the European Union’s voters might not be very supportive. It might place into 
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question the process of enlargement as a whole, and from this perspective it might cause 
problems. But the bottom line is that it would be less expensive, it would defuse tensions 
throughout the Balkans, and the “powder keg” in the backyard of Europe would be 
defused.     
 Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Euro-Atlantic institutions have taken 
responsibility for the security of the Western Balkans, and the region has become their 
permanent concern. The stabilization of the Western Balkans and the overcoming of past 
and recent mistrust and suspicion between different peoples of the region are crucial 
challenges on the way to a sustainable pan-European security and prosperity. They are 
also real tests for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. 
Therefore, NATO and the EU military presence continue to assist in BiH, Kosova and 
Macedonia with the assistance of other friendly states.  
 This short note shows that the Western Balkans, de facto, is part of the North 
Atlantic Alliance Area. None of these states directly involved in the war had the 
membership card, but they have been treated according to Article 5 of the Alliance: 
Serbia attacked them and NATO attacked Serbia. But, in spite of the aspirations, the 
summit of Prague left behind the Western Balkans for future consideration. But it did not 
give up struggling for the membership card. Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and the United 
States will closely cooperate under the Adriatic Partnership Charter (working program) 
for full integration into NATO and other European institutions. 
 So why not grant them an official invitation? In their approach to the future, the 
Western Balkans looks to Europe, the United States, and the West in general. Partial 
integration in the EU and NATO membership would be a lighter burden and the situation 
would improve very soon. It would defuse tensions in the region, and, above all, Western 
Balkans nationalism.  
 In this context, the final status of Kosova plays an important role for the stability 
of the region. So far, the Kosovars have suffered and fight and vote to have their own 
state based on the rule of law and integrated in the EU, opened to the International 
Community. The sooner this aspiration is realized the better for the Kosovars, for the 
region and for Europe.  
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 Security, law and order, and economic development would be facilitated. Less 
money would be spent, and revenue would be maximized.  
 NATO membership and partial integration would help Serbia and Montenegro 
implement armed forces reform soon, preventing further bloodshed. It would suffocate 
and eventually annihilate the dark forces which assassinated Serbian Prime Minister 
Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003 and continue to threaten the transformations in the 
newly created federation. The new status would liberate the region from the darkness of 
the past as it struggles to survive the expenses of democratic transformation.  
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